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IRREGULARITIES OF TESTAMENTARY EXPRESSION
By ALvir E. EvANs*
The writing of a document requires the use of symbols of
thought and these symbols are chosen either by the maker himself or by the agent or draftsman chosen by him. Either may
choose inaccurate symbols. To what extent may they differ in
effect from that given them by objective standards (e.g., standards of literature) but conform to the individual standard of the
maker? Judge Cardozo has aptly said, "Signs and symbols
must be turned into their equivalent realities. . . . How
far the process will be extended is a question of degree.''A
Lord Bacon has added to the usual difficulties of courts in interpreting symbols by creating his famous antithesis between latent
and patent ambiguities.
Wigram, also, clear and succinct and liberal as he was in
his day, sought to clarify the problem of interpretation by his
second proposition that a plain meaning (objectively determined)
cannot be disturbed, no matter what testator's actual intent may
have been. It is followed in many quarters, not as a maxim of
caution, but as an unyielding rule without reference to its consequences. It seems absurd, for example, to assign a legacy to a
beneficiary identified by name only of whom testator may never
have heard just because some person exists in the world bearing
the exact name used. It is only somewhat less absurd to make
the award to one who is so slightly within the ken of the testator
that it is highly improbable that he is the intended beneficiary.
Vaughn Hawkins, the elder Thayer, and Wigmore all found this
antithesis of Bacon and the plain meaning rule of Wigram
* Dean of the College of Law, University of Kentucky. Author
of various articles on Wills, Administration of Estates, Trusts, Contracts and Community Property.
'.Re Rausch, 258 N. Y. 334, 179 N. E. 757 (1932).
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embedded in the decisions and have struggled to limit or modify
their consequences.
The English courts have adopted the practice of "striking
out" under some circumstances in order to be rid of objectionable matter, which apparently conflicts with the intent. American courts are more likely to reach much the same result by construction and this seems to be the only justifiable procedure.
If the testator knows the words he is using, there may still
be some irregularity in case, unknown to him, they have a legal
significance which he does not conceive that they have. It has
usually been assumed that if he read the will over, or if it were
read to him, he knew both the individual words and their combined import. It seems, then, that a discussion of irregularities
of expression should not be divorced from the issue of knowledge
of the contents and of understanding of their legal effect.
The title of this paper is "Irregularities of Expression"
rather than "Mistake". Professor Page defines "mistake" as
"the unconscious ignorance or forgetfulness of some fact .. .
as a result of which testator executed a will which otherwise he
would not have executed."' Professor Atkinson describes mistake as relating either (1) to the document executed; (2) to the
contents; (3) to the legal effect of the words; (4) to matters of
inducement; or (5) to description of the property or of the
2
beneficiary.
Jarman 3 discusses "mistake" in two pages and concerns
himself with (a) the identity of the instrument and (b) insertions and omissions. On page 32 he says: "If the execution of
a will has been induced by mistake probate of it will be refused."
On the opposite page (33) he states: "As a general rule a
bequest that is induced by mistake ...is nevertheless valid."
This is purely a verbal clash and is caused by the application of
the term "mistake" to entirely disparate situations.
Since the illustrations of mistake are of such an infinite
variety that a useful classification is not at hand, it seems better
"Page, Wills (2d ed., 1926), See. 168.
'Atkinson, Wills (1937) 228. See Rood, Wills (2d ed., 1926), Sees.
153-168; Godolphin, The Orphan's Legacy, 446 (10), (11). (The problems of mistake are treated as arising from errors of expression.)
Theobold, Treatise on Wills (8th ed., 1927), 132-144, and Underhill,
Wills (1900), Vol. 1, Sec. 164, Vol. 2, Sees. 595-600, 912-914, contain
useful discussions. Many of the current treatises are completely or
substantially worthless on this subject.
Wills (7th ed., 1930), 32-33.

3
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to suggest an arrangement of the materials under a heading
which lends itself to a surer analysis. Types of irregularities of
testamentary expression are believed to exist and when the illustrations of each are brought together, more suitable conclusions
may be reached.
Thus, the issue of mistake would be confined principally to
mistake of inducement or motive. When mistake is so confined-,
most authorities agree with Professor Warren, 4 that unless the
mistake appears upon the face of the instrument, the will stands
a- written.5 Further consideration of mistake of motive is not
given in this paper.
The types of irregularities which are here to be investigated
are (a) misdescriptions, whether of beneficiaries or of the property given, usually involving a falsa deronstratio; (b) loose,
inexact or informal descriptions which do not permit of technical
interpretations, if the intent is to control. Another rather common situation arises (c) where testator's expression is eliptical or
4Warren (1928), Fraud, Undue Influence, and Mistake in Wills,
41 Harv. L. Rev. 309, 329.
5Re Carson, 184 Cal. 437, 194 Pac. 5, Note, 17 A. L. R. 248 (1920)
(Gift to one who sustains relation of wife may be avoided for fraud
but not for mistake).
Cf., Wenning v. Teepee, 144 Ind. 189,
41 N. E. 600 (1895); Durham v. Avery, 45 Conn. 61 (1877); Jones v.
Habersham, 63 Ga. 146 (1879) (Mistake as to identity of next of kin);
Jones v. Grogan, 98 Ga. 552, 25 S. E. 590 (1896) (Mistake respecting
heirs' attitude); Bohler v. Hicks, 120 Ga. 800, 48 S. E. 306 (1904);
Dibble v. Currier, 142 Ga. 855, 83 S. E. 948 (1914) (same); Adams v.
Cooper, 148 Ga. 352, 96 S. E. 858 (1914) (similar); Smith v. Diggs,
128 Md. 394, 97 Atl. 712 (1916); 130 Md. 101, 99 Atl. 952 (1917); (simliar); Hayes v. Hayes, 21 N. J. Eq. 265 (1S71) (The will gave a brother
$15,000. A codicil reduced this amount because as erroneously recited
testator had given the legatee other property. Reduction stands);
Creeky v. Ostrander, 3 Brad. 107 (N. Y. Surr. 1855) (One of next of
kin overlooked); Clapp v. Fullerton, 34 N. Y. 190 (1866) (Daughter
mistakenly believed illegitimate); Re White, 121 N. Y. 406, 24 N. E. 935
(1890) (Mistaken belief regarding son's attitude); Bedlow's Will,
22 N. Y .S. 290 (Sup. Ct. 1893) (Mistake as to attitude of family); re
Janes, 33 N. Y. S. 968, Affd., 152 N. Y. 647, 46 N. E. 1148 (1897) (Legacy to housekeeper under the belief that she was unmarried, testator
having declared that he would not have a married woman as housekeeper); Mendenhall's Appeal, 124 Pa. 387, 16 Atl. 881 (1889) (Revocation of a legacy because testator erroneously believed that he had
made a gift of certain stocks to legatee's husband.) See N. 106, 115, 116
and 117 infra.
For mistake appearing on the face of the will, see Mordecai v.
Boylan, 59 N. C. 365 (1863) (T by codicil gave his grandson a legacy
because, as alleged, the latter had been disinherited in the will. But
this was not true and he accordingly does not take the codicilliary
legacy). But a revocation may be set aside because of mistake which
does not appear on the face of the will. See Snyder v. Raymond, 48
Idaho 810, 285 Pac. 478 (1930); Cf., Padelford's Estate, 190 Pa. 35,
42 Atl. 381 (1899).
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incomplete. Often the language is cryptic, or there is an hiatus
or an inconcinnity in the expression, the meaning of which must
be patiently spelled out by the court within the limits of the
Wills Statute. (d) The enumeration of beneficiaries has often
been faulty so that a conflict arises between the dominant intent
respecting the beneficiaries and the number of beneficiaries
actually named. (e) The problem of the identity of the executed
instrument arises now and then as also (f) dubious assertions
respecting advancements. It seems wise, first, to examine, as a
useful prelude, the matter of latent and patent ambiguities, which
may lurk in all types of irregularities of expression.
LATENT AND PATENT A!BIGUITxES

As already indicated, the idea of a sharp and all pervading
distinction between latent and patent ambiguities arose with
Bacon.8 This notion has some inherent significance but often
proves deceptive in its consequences. The frequent repetition
of it tends to conceal its dangers. Courts have frequently been
misled by the formula that latent ambiguities may be clarified by
extrinsic evidence, whereas patent ambiguities may not be so
explained. The stock illustration of a latent ambiguity was a
gift to a named person, there being two who equally well fitted
the description, or a gift of "my manor of Dale" when there
See 9 Holdsworth, "History of English
a Maxims Regula, XXV.
Law" (1926), 219-222; 7 ib. 389-390. Thayer, on the Parol Evidence
Rule (Chaper X) in A preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law (1898), says of Bacon's distinction, p. 424, "Bacon's Maxim
was an unprofitable subtlety." "Bacon, when he spoke of ambiguities,
latent and patent, meant only a limited sort of thing, namely, what
he said, 'ambiguity'." "Bacon's maxim is inadequate and uninstructive," p. 482. He further says that Bacon's maxim, enunciated about
1596-97, laid unnoticed until 1761, when it was resurrected by Apsley,
uncle of Buller. See also 1 Jarman on Wills (7th ed., 1930), p. 493;
5 Am. Law. Reg. (N. S. 1866), p. 140, Patent and Latent Ambiguities
by S. H. 0. It is commonly stated in the American cases that a patent
ambiguity cannot be explained by extrinsic evidence. See Evans v.
Van Meter, 320 Ill. 195, 150 N. E. 693 (1926) (Will gave all to wife.
"In default of her death", over. Since ambiguity is patent, parol evidence is inadmissible. Presumption of vesting in first taker applied).
Cf., Grimes v. Harmon, 35 Ind. 198, 208 (1871); McConnell v. Robbins,
193 Ind. 359, 140 N. B. 59 (1923) (T gave all his estate to a trustee
and all the rest to A); Bank of Manhattan v. Gray, 53 R. I. 377,
166 AtI. 817 (1933) (T gave all his estate to a trustee, all the rest and
residue to A. "If this is an ambiguity, it is patent"); Jennings v. Talbert, 77 S. C. 458, 58 S. E. 420 (1907) ("Ambiguity is patent where
there is a conflict between words and clauses").
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were two of them. 7 Bacon's hypothetical illustrations of a
patent ambiguity were a devise of land to I. D. and I. S. et haeredibus, and a devise of ten acres of land not further described, the
testator being seized of one hundred acres. A patent ambiguity,
then, so it is said is an uncertainty appearing upon the face of
the will which cannot be explained and which causes the will, or
parts of it, to fail. It is said that the uncertainty cannot be
resolved by extrinsic evidence, for that would be to make an
insensible will sensible by an unattested act. As a matter of
fact, the English courts have often done just that thing.8
There was no consistent rule by which the two types were
clearly distinguished. Thus, while it has been held that where
there was a gift to one of the sons of J. S., he having several,
the one intended could not be identified by extrinsic evidence,"
yet a gift to "Godly persons" could be so explained. 10 Ambiguities or equivocations vary in the degree of the intelligibility
manifested. If an instrument is completely insensible, it seems
that no evidence to put meaning into it should be permissible.
1 Redfield, Wills (4th ed., 1876) 507; 1 Jarman, Wills (7th ed.,
1930) 492, 494. "An ambiguity apparent on the face of the will cannot
be explained by parol evidence." Jarman, however (493) says the distinction is unsubstantial or is confined to a special class of cases.
Fonnereau v. Poyntz, 1 Bro. C. C. 472 (Ch. 1785) (T gave the sum
of £500 stock In long annuities to A, same to B, and £200 to C. As
annuities this called for 10 times more assets than T had and left
nothing to the residuary legatees. Evidence of the condition of the
estate was admitted to show that T meant to give each a principal sum
of the amount named rather than annuities. In Colpoys v. Colpoys,
Jacb. 451 (Ch. 1822), the facts being almost identical, the court spoke
of exceptions to the rule as to patent ambiguities. "Common sense
and the law of England (rarely at variance) warrant the departure
from the general rule and call in the light of extrinsic evidence." See
Penick v. Walker, 125 Va. 274, 99 S. E. 559 (1919) (The will directed

that $10,000 be paid to a legatee "which sum can be made up out of

my insurance policies". These policies were already payable to her
(daughter). There was no intent to give her-an additional sum.
*Strode v. Russell, 2 Vern. 621, 625 (Ch. 1708). Cf. cases cited In
n. 94. See Jansen v. Field, cited in Rogers v. Pittis, 1 Add. 30, 38 (Eccl.,
1822) (a reference to a codicil of a named date, there being none of that
date, was said to be a patent ambiguity); Smith v. Doe, 2 Brod. & B.
473, 553 (C. P. 1821) (similar); Grainger v. Dawson (1900), 2 Ch. 756,
773 (an uncertainty upon the face of the will was resolved by extrinsic
evidence). In Castledon v. Turner, 3 Atk. 257 (Ch., 1745), T gave his
lands to his wife for life, then over to her niece. Then, he gave the
"use of £600 during her natural life and after her decease to the
brothers and sisters of my said wife." This was called a patent
ambiguity and was explained. See also Gord v. Gord, 2 M. & W. 129
(Exch., 1836).
1,Shore v. Wilson, 9 Cl. & Fin. 355 (H. L., 1842).
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Such a document is sometimes declared to be ambiguous. There
are perhaps three gradations of expression, all of which may in
some -sense be called ambiguous. The lowest form is that of
insensibility, to which the term ambiguity is not properly applied.
Rising somewhat from that and not utterly devoid of sense is the
case of obscurity 1 of expression. Finally, the situation arises
where an instrument is susceptible of two or more interpretations. It may be described as being uncertain or equivocal or
truly ambiguous. Perhaps it should be observed that while an
ambiguity is an obscurity, an obscurity need not be and very
often is not an ambiguity.
In Eichorn v. Morat' 2 the testatrix said: "I ... bequeath
iy personal and real estate which I received... without security
so long as lie lives, and should le have need he can sell it." This
is a clear case of an obscurity which might be termed a patent
ambuigity. The will does not indicate what "he" was intended.
The Kentucky court, however, admitted proof that the testatrix
was a German woman and that German women habitually referred to their husbands as "he" and therefore that "my husband" was the unexpressed antecedent of he. This court will
have its difficulty in the future if it still proposes to abide by
Bacon's distinction.
There seems to be no adequate justification for saying that
an obscure instrument may not be clarified by evidence of the
circumstances affecting its execution,13 appropriate caution being
n A provision written in code known and used in a business may
be interpreted according to the usage of a business and may be trans.
lated as in Kell v. Charmer, 23 Beav. 195 (Rolls Ct., 1856), where a
gift to testator's son of the sum of i.x.x was interpreted by the code
used by jewelers. It is not, properly speaking, obscure. In Goblet
V. Beechey where the testator had in his codicil named certain articles
of little value giving them to B and among the items he had written
"inoV it was held that this term was too obscure to cause a revocation of a gift in the will to A of his valuable "models". It may have
been a symbol known only to testator.
12175 Ky. 180, 193 S. W. 1013 (1917). Note the absurd result in
Bruce v. Bruce, 90 N. J. Eq. 118, 105 Atl. 492 (1918). Paragraphs 2-7
of the will were devises; 8-15 were bequests. Paragraph 16 devised
certain land to my son, John S. Bruce, and ended in the middle of a
line. Paragraph 17 gave the residue to "him and his heirs and executors". Held, paragraph 17 being apparently independent of 16, can.
Uot be construed with the latter. Thus, there is a patent ambiguity,
extrinsic evidence is inadmissible and the residuary clause fails. See
17 Mich. L. Rev. 610 (1919).
"See Payne v. Todd, 45 Ariz. 389, 43 P. (2d) 1004 (1935); dictum
In Bond v. Riley, 317 Mo. 594, 296 S. W. 401 (1927).
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observed respecting the admission of testator's own declarations
whether oral or made in other preserved wills. A distinction has
been taken between oblique and direct declarations. 14 Thus,
"Look in my desk and get my will"' 15 is an oblique statement
showing the testator's mental attitude toward an existing instrument and may be admitted in evidence in the proper case. If the
question were one whether testator meant A or B to be legatee of
a particular legacy, the direct declaration that he had given a
legacy to A in his will would not be acceptable.' 0
With this brief look at Bacon's antithesis, we are ready to
examine specific types of irregularities.
I.

MISDESCRIPTIONTS

Mlisdescriptions occur both with respect to the beneficiary
and the property. The general principle applicable to them is,
that where enough appears upon the face of the will to indicate
what the intention was, the false description will not defeat the
will, falsa demostratio nzon iocet. The beneficiary may be a
charity, or an individual. In either case there may be a competition between claimants, each maintaining that it or he is the
beneficiary intended and that the description, wholly or partially
fits him. An individual beneficiary may be misdescribed either
by name or by his relationship to the testator or to another person, or by the statement of certain qualities or characteristics
asserted in the will. The misdescription of the property may
consist of a partial misstatement of a quality or of a loose description capable of varying degrees of identification when applied to
the object.

1.

Tim BENEFICIARY
(a)

Charities. According to Wigram's second proposition,

"4Warren, Interpretation of Wills-Recent Developments (1936),
49 Harv. L. Rev. 689, 708. See on testator's declarations p. ibid. 705 if;
Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence (1898), 440-444; 5 Wigmore
on Evidence, Secs. 2471-2472; Wigram on Wills (4th ed., 1858), Proposition II. But see Hawkins on the Principles of Legal Interpretation found in appendix C of Thayer's treatise, ibid., 577, 579 (1860).
See Restatement of Property, tentative draft No. 7, Sec. 242j.
2Phelps v. Ashton, 30 Tex. 345 (1867). Cf., McDonald v. McDonald, 142 Ind. 55, 41 N. E. 336 (1895).
MSee Warren, Interpretation of Wills-Recent Developments
(1936), 49 Harv. L. Rev. 689, 705-711 (1936); Thayer, op. cit., n. 7 at
p. 435. But see Von Fell v. Spirling, 96 N. J. Eq. 20, 124 AUt. 518
(1924); re McIlhattan's Estate, 198 Wis. 518, 224 N. W. 713 (1929).
See, contra, re Wrenn (1908), 2 Ir. R. 370; 49 Harv. L. Rev., at 704.
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where there is a beneficiary exactly corresponding to the name or
description given, no evidence of a contrary'intent is admissible.
A rigid application of his proposition must necessarily result in
a failure to accomplish the intent of the testator in many cases.
Thus 17 a Scotsman named The National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children as beneficiary but all his associations
were with the Scottish National Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Children. He had lived all his life in Scotland and
the latter society had recently been called to his attention. He
did not know of the former, which did not operate in Scotland.
Wigram's rule, unfortunately, was applied. 18 The more recent
rule is to admit the evidence. In most cases the description does
not fit accurately any known charity. If there be competition
between claimants, it is not necessarily the one whose name is
most nearly like the one used in the will, that prevails. Thus, a
legacy to "Sailors' Home of Boston" was awarded not to the
"National Sailors' Home" but to the "Boston Ladies Bethel
Society" which maintained a sailors' bhome in Boston. 19
- National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children v.
Scottish National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children
(1915), A. C. 207.
"Another extreme case in Union Trust Co. v. St. Luke's Hospital,
77 N. Y. S. 528 (1902), Affd., 175 N. Y. 505 (Devise to "skin and cancer
hospital"). The competitors were N. Y. Skin & Cancer Hospital and
New York Cancer Hospital. Court would not permit evidence to show
the latter was intended; Tucker v. Seaman's Aid Society, 7 Mete. 188
(Mass., 1843) (legacy to Seamans' Aid Society"; "Seamans' Friend
Society" claimed it. Proof that T did not know of the existence of
the Seamans' Aid Society was not admitted. In Minot v. Curtis,
7 Mass. 441 (1811), however, it was recognized that a corporation
might be popularly known by many different names.
" Faulkner v. National Sailors Home, 155 Mass. 458, 29 N. E. 645
(1892). In In re Kilvert's Trusts, L. R. 7 Ch. 170 (1871), the name
of the legatee being inaccurate, the beneficiary was determined between
competitors by the fact that testator had contributed in the past only
to the one (here preferred). In King v. Long, I. L. T. Rep. 60 (1919),
an Irish testatrix bequeathed certain stocks to "The American Society
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children". None existed by that
name. Being a foreign charity, the doctrine of cy pres and of administration by sign manual did not apply. In various American cities
there were societies of that general nature. The uncertainty was
resolved by evidence that T had lived in New York, the stocks had
been bequeathed to T by a former N. Y. owner. The New York Society
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children was the first in the field and
best known and so was identified as the one intended (no competitor);
In re Little's Estate, 170 Cal. 52, 148 Pac. 194 (1915) (Legacy to
Womans' Christian Temperance Union of L. A. Three competitors.
Awarded to the one that owned and managed a temperance temple);
In re Moeller's Estate, 199 Cal. 705, 251 Pac. 311 (1926) (Legacy to
"Mount Mellick Union Workhouse" awarded ot Laioghis Hospital and
Homes Commission which by statute had charge of the said work-
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(b) Individuals. Mr. Justice Holmes once said :20 "By
the theory of our language, while other words may mean different
things, a proper name means one person and no other." This
statement seems to be a limited adoption of Wigram's second
proposition. It is agreed that while one name may be "idem
sonanzs" with another, yet the two are different names. But if
the name alone is conclusive of identity it would follow that if
only one person in the world should happen to bear the name
used, he would take the gift no matter whether he were completely unknown to the donor, or were in the outer fringe of his
acquaintances, or were an intimate friend or a close relative.
A court should most certainly look further if the only claimant
of the exact name were a complete stranger and it is almost as

certain that the testator did not mean to be generous toward anyone with whom he had merely a bowing acquaintance. We should
house). In Dunham v. Averill, 45 Conn. 61 (1877) [Legacy to the
"American and Foreign Missionary Board" was awarded to The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (apparently no
competitor). But in Fairfield v. Lawson, 50 Conn. 501 (1883) a legacy
to the "Freedman's Association" failed, though there was apparently
no competitor. There was a Freedman's Aid Society of the M. E.
Church located in Cincinnati, but evidence identifying it with the
named legatee was refused]; In re Stuart's Estate, 184 Ia. 165, 168
N. W. 779 (1918) [Legacy to the "German Lutheran Church" of Audubon, Ia. Competitors are "The German Evangelical Peace Association", commonly called the "German Lutheran Church" and the "German Evangelical St. John's Church". The former was preferred:
(a) It was first organized; (b) prior wills had provided for it before
the latter was established]; State Trust Co. v. Pierce, 126 Me. 67,
136 Atl. 289 (1927) (Gift to Maine State Society for Protection of
Animals goes to Maine State Society for Protection of Animals. Apparently no competition); Doan v. Vestry of Parish of Ascension, 103 Md.
662, 64 Atl. 314 (1906) (Gift to "Vestry of Ascension Church, Ascension Parish", goes to "Vestry of the Parish of Ascension"); Tilton v.
American Bible Society, 60 N. H. 377 (1880) (Gift to "Bible Society".
There being several claimants, it was awarded to the American Bible
Society because it was shown that contributions had been taken for it
In T's church); Caldwell Nat. Bank v. Rickard, 103 N. J. Ch. 516,
143 Atl. 745 (1928) (A legacy to "Richmond Memorial Hospital"
awarded to "Memorial Home at Prince's Bay, S. I."; inasmuch as T
commonly referred to the Home by the above designation and it was
the only organization of that character at that place. No competition); Lefevre v. Lefevre, 59 N. Y. 434 (1875) (Legacy to "Home of
the Friendless". There was no institution so named and it went to
the American Female Guardian Society, whose object was to provide
relief for the friendless and on whose building was the inscription,
"Home of the Friendless"). Cf., also State Trust Co. v. Pierce, 126 Me.
67, 136 Atl. 289 (1927); Tillinghast v. Council, Etc., 47 R. I. 406,
133 Atl. 662 (1926); Tarwater v. Baptist Orphans Home, 119 S. W.
(2d) 919 (Tenn., 1938).
Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation (1899), 12 Harv. L.
Rev. 417, 418.
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therefore reach the conclusion that the exact name of an individual is no more determinative than is the name of a charity. We
have already seen in the latter case that the variations in name
identifications are as great as are those in other word usages.
It has generally not been difficult to identify the beneficiary
where there is a conflict in the description but no competition of
claimants: 21 Though in many of the cases there is either a competition between persons claiming as beneficiaries or between
these and the heirs of the decedent, still the tendency is overwhelmingly in favor of the admission of evidence to qualify the
language and to identify the beneficiary, even in cases where
there is a person who exactly fulfills the description. Two recent
cases illustrate this tendency. In Moseley v. Goodman2 2 T gave
a legacy to "Mrs. Moseley" and another to "Mrs. Moseley's
housekeeper". Mrs. Lenoir Mlose.ley claimed the legacy, as did
also Mrs. Lillian Trimble. The testator had had no association
with Mrs. Lenoir Moseley. He had traded with one Trimble,
21Goods of Shuttleworth, 1 Curt. 911 (Eccl., 1838) (Gift to "Barton
Nicholas Shuttleworth" awarded to "Barton Nicholas Bayey". Cf.,
Beaumont v. Fell, 2 P. Wms. 151 (1723) (Legacy to Catharine-none
such but there was one named Gatty); Gilchrist v. Corliss, 155 Mich.
126, 118 N. W. 938 (1908) (Misstatement of name and residence does
not make gift fail); In re Halston (1912), 1 Ch. 435 (Gift to "John
William Halston" awarded to "John Robert Halston"); In Goods of
Cooper (1899), 1. 193, T appointed "Thomas Stevenson" to be one of
several trustees and "the said Thomas Cooper" to be one of his
executors. (The court should not find it troublesome as a matter of
law to find that "Stevenson" was intended. It has "said" and
"Thomas" to rely on); In re Wray (1916), 1 Ch. 461 [Devise to T's
nephew Frederick Johnson awarded to Joseph Francomb Johnstone,
partly because he was sometimes called "Fred" and partly because he
was a barber and T had said that the premises devised would be a good
barber shop location (oblique declaration?)]; Gregson v. Taylor (1917),
P. 256 (Legacy in will to Adelaide Maude Ashewin, wife of F. l. B. A.
Legacy in codicil to Maude Adelaide Askewin, daughter of F. M. B. A.,
goes to same person); In re Ofner (1909), 1 Ch. 60 (To grand-nephew
Robert Ofner. There was no Robert but T had four grand-nephews,
Alfred, Curt, Richard and Botho. Awarded to Alfred); Covert v.
Sebern, 73 Ia. 564, 35 N. W. 636 (1887) (H. S. Covert identified as J. H.
Covert); Gordon v. Burrs, 141 Mo. 602, 43 S. W. 642 (1897) (Legacy
to T's granddaughter Lucy May Gordon awarded to granddaughter
Mary J. Gordon); Farrell v. Sullivan, 49 R. I. 468, 144 Atl. 155 (1929)
(Legacies to "Arline Dyer, daughter of J. H. D." and to "William
Cronin", son of W. G. C." awarded to "Helene Dyer" and "Daniel
Cronin"). 54 N. C. 110 (1861), is contra (Legacy to "Celia". There
was no "Celia" but there was a "Sarah". Held, mistake could not be
corrected. The result here is doubtless due to the pleadings. A bill
was filed to reform the will and the court held it had no power of
reformation).
2138 Tenn. 1, 195 S.W. 590 (1917). For further discussion, see
Warren, Interpretationof Wills-Recent Developments (1936), 49 Hary.
L. Rev. 689, 690-698.
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husband of Lillian Trimble, who was a representative for a
wholesaler "Moseley" and so he called "Trimble" "Moseley".
He also roomed at the home of Mrs. Trimble, whom he always
called "Mirs. Moseley" and both she and her housekeeper had
given him devoted attention in his illness. Evidence of the real
intent was admitted. So in Siegley v. Simpson 23 T made a bequest to "my friend Richard H. Simpson". For years he had
been intimately associated with one "Hamilton Ross Simpson".
There was a person, Richard H. Simpson, barely known to the
testator, who claimed the legacy. The word "friend" helps to
identify Hamilton Ross Simpson, but without that, it seems the
court would have awarded the legacy to the latter. These cases
illustrate the absurdity of the primary meaning rule as even
24
recently followed.
Reference to a jury of the question of identity should be
even more a matter of course where, instead of the name, the
relationship or characteristics or qualities of the beneficiary are
inaccurately given. Thus, a gift to a beneficiary identified but
erroneously described as "wife" should not fail. 25 So a gift to
my niece (correct) Mary (incorrect), daughter of my sister,
Mary (correct but ambiguous, there being two daughters, Mary
and Annie), resident of New York (correct) was awarded to
Annie (Mary lived in Ireland).26
273 Wash. 69, 131 Pac. 479 (1913).
"National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children v.
Scottish National Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children (1915),
A. C. 207.
21n re Boddington (1832), 25 Ch. Div. 685; Re Smalley (1929),
2 Ch. 112; Martindale v. Bridgeforth, 210 Ala. 565, 98 So. 800 (1924)
("To my half-sister, Alice Bridgeforth", gift does not fail because
T was mistaken in the relationship.)
"Donnellan's Estate, 164 Cal. 14, 127 Pac. 166 (1912). See note
(1912), 1 Calif. L. Rev. 87; Careless v. Careless, 19 Ves. Jr. 601 (Ch.,
1816) (Legacies to two nephews, Robert C., one the son of brother
John, the other the son of brother Joseph. There was such a son of
John but there was no brother Joseph. "Robert C.", son of "Thomas",
prevailed); Still v. Hoste, 6 Madd. 192 (V. C. 1821) (Legacy to Sophia,
daughter of Peter. Peter had two daughters, Selina and Mary. Direct
a reference to the jury); Doe v. Hiscocks, 5 M. & W. 364 (Exch., 1839)
(To son J. for life, then to his oldest son, J., and thereafter to the
oldest son, John, in tail male in succession. J's oldest son was named
Simon. The oldest son by his second wife was named John. An issue
was directed as to T's intent); Bernasconi v. Atkinson, 10 Hare 344
(V. C., 1S53) (Legacy to "my first cousin Vincent", commonly called
"Vincent" son of T's "Uncle Joseph". Peter's son was named "Frederick". Evidence shows that T meant the former; Re Taylor, 34 Ch. D.
255 (1886) (To "cousin Harriet Cloak"; T had no own cousin by that
name but had two cousins by marriage, one, "Harriet Crane" nee

K. L. J.-2
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Three cases of this type call for special comment. In Goo0
of Durlacher2 7 testator bequeathed legacies to F. L. S. and to
T. S., children of J. F. S., and to G and to R, children of A. E. S.
and F. S. The names and relationships were reversed, the latter
named legatees being the children of the first named parents and
the first named children being the offspring of the last named
forbears. The result was that all four legacies failed. Such a
miscarriage may well be attributable (a) to the Baconian distinction between latent and patent ambiguities as regards extrinsic evidence, this being declared a patent ambiguity; (b) to the
common practice in England of striking out words used erroneously (which words, in this case the court would not strike
because it was not shown that they were mistakenly inserted)
and to the application of Wigram's "plain meaning" rule.
As shown above, there are many precedents for accepting the
name for identification and disregarding the relationship. A
sound construction in the light of the facts would have accomplished the testator's wishes in that case. The beneficiaries were
identified sufficiently to make it possible to disregard the erroneous statement of relationship. A sounder result was reached in
In Re Dorninici's Estate.28 The testator gave the residue to
three legatees, viz. to his sister, L. J., to his nephew, H. S., and
to his nephew's sister "my niece residing at Luchow". This
niece's name was Christine. After the death of L. J. the testator, by codicil, gave the lapsed share to the "other two residuary
legatees", describing them this time as H. S. and his sister
"Marie Kohler, living at Altmark". "Marie Kohler" was another niece of the testator but was not the sister of H. S. It was
"Cloak", and the other "Harriet Cloak". Latter was one intended);
Re Estate of Cawley (1920), Ir. R. 78 ("All my property to my sister Annie Neary". He had four sisters, all living in America. One was
a nun. The other three, Mary Walsh, Annie Flynn and Bessie Neary.
Given to Annie Flynn and parol evidence is not necessary. Given name
will prevail over married name); In re King's Will, 132 S. C. 63, 128
S. E. 850 (1925) (T had two daughters, "Bessie" a normal child, and
"Lessie", a cripple. The will provides for Bessie, who is described as
the afflicted one. His intent is clear and the description prevails over
the name).
-75 L. T. 664 (1896).
2S151 Cal. 181, 90 Pa. 448 (1907). In Hare v. Cartridge, 13 Sim.
165, 60 Eng. Rep. 63 (V. C., 1842), the will read, "residue to my first
cousins, the children of my father's brother of the name of Cartridge".
Father had two brothers of that name, each of whom left children.
The court struck out "children of my father's brother" and gave the
residue to testator's "first cousins named Cartridge". Case Is questioned in In re Stephenson (1897), 1 Ch. 75.
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held that Christine takes one third under the will and Marie
Kohler takes one sixth under the codicil. A statute in California 29 is regarded by the court as requiring the unraveling
of patent ambiguities. One court disregarded the matter of relationship as stated and reached a sensible result by construction.
In a Massachusetts case " the testatrix had given certain property
in trust for her son, N, and his wife and on the death of the survivor over to "their three children". N and his wife had no
children. Testatrix, however, had three grandchildren, offApring of a deceased child, of whom she was very fond and they
were otherwise unprovided for. The court said (a) if N had
had children they would have been testatrix' grandchildren;
(b) she therefore meant to give to her grandchildren and since
there were no children of N she meant to give the property to the
children of her other child now deceased. The only other
alternative is a partial intestacy.
There is under this interpretation a misdescription of the
beneficiaries, they being erroneously called the children of N.
Then there is the inference that since the children of N must be
testatrix' grandchildren, grandchildren of different parentage
are intended. The court declared it had no power to reform the
will and the result must be reached by construction. The
language means "to my three grandchildren, the children of N
and his wife." The words "the children of N and his wife"
were disregarded (stricken under the English practice). This is
a sound method of approach under the applicable precedents.
2.

THE SUBJECT MATTTER

There are two types of misdescription of property, particularly of land, one of which involves a falsa demonstratio. The
other type is illustrated by Doe v. Chiclester,31 where the question was should "Ashton Estate" be used in a more or in a less
comprehensive sense. These latter cases are considered under
gifts by implication, both for convenience and as a matter of
classification. The type where there is a clear misdescription is
discussed at this point.
One of the common errors arises in the effort to describe
"Probate Code of California (Deering, 1937), See. 105; see Bordwell, Statute Law of Wills (1929), 14 Ia. L. Rev. 1, 436.
" Polsdy v. Newton, 199 Mass. 450, 85 N. E. 574 (1908).
Dow 65 (H. L., 1816).
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rural lands by subsection, section, and range, and urban realty
by subdivision, square, and lot. There may be different situa.tions:
1. The subsection figures may be partly erroneous but may
still include the land intended to be devised, seeing that the
section and range are accurately stated, in which event Professor
Wigmore would say that the description will be accepted, dis3
regarding the part that does not fit. 2

2. The error may be such that the description does not embrace the land intended to be devised nor land owned by the
testator. In that event (a) the land may still be identifiable if
he has used "my" or the equivalent, applicable to it. It is unnecessary to a devise to describe land by metes and bounds, as is
the usual practice in a conveyance. Thus, a falsa demonstratio
arises. (b) There may be nothing on the face of the will to
show what land was intended other than that described, which he
did not own. Here the doctrine of falsa demonstratio is inapplicable because there is nothing to identify the premises save the
demontratio, which is falsa.
It has been urged, however, that decisions such as Kurtz v.
Hibnlet, 33 the leading case, are erroneous. There the testator
had devised a lot in section 32 of the town of Joliet, which he did
not own, though he did own-a lot in section 31. It was held that
parol evidence was inadmissible to show that he meant a lot in
section 31. The opposing argument is that the remainder of the
description is correct and sufficient to identify the property intended, inasmuch as testator could not have intended to give a lot
he did not own. 34 But to so hold involves dealing cavalierly
with the wills act, and is not justifiable. Professor Wigmore
favors reading into the language the assumption that the testator
intended to devise his own lot, which amounts, as he admits, to an
exception to the rule against implying terms into the will.ss
"Note (1911), 5 Ill. L. Rev. 315. Possibly Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick, 36 Ia. 674 (1873), and Wilmes v. Tiernay, 187 Ia. 390, 174
N. W. 271 (1919), would illustrate this situation. See Stevens v. Felman, 338 Ill. 391, 170 N. E. 243 (1930).
-55 Ill. 514 (1870).
"See note (1871), 10 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 93, 97, and reply thereto,
4b., p. 353.
"6Note (1911), 5 Ill. L. Rev. 315, 316. See Weichert v. Weichert,
317 Mo. 118, 294 S.W. 721 (1927).
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Kales would not quarrel with such an implication.3 6

Warren-

is against it.37
There seems to be no more reason for courts to go further
in this type of case than in other cases of testamentary hardship.
The question is not whether the testator meant to give a lot which
he owned, in which case it is possible to apply falsa demonstratio
but rather the issue is whether the testator has made a devise in
writing which can be effective. He has not in this case identified
anything that can pass 3 8 under his will.
Patch v. Vite 39 is the leading decision in which the devise
would have failed if the equivalent of "my" had not been used.
The testator devised lot No. 6 in square 403 though he owned
Lot No. 3 in square 406, but he used additional words which were
held to identify the property and to make the principle of falsa
demonstratio applicable. Thus, he described the premises as
(lot 6 in square 403 was not). He said
being "improved"
"touching worldly estate whereof it has pleased Almighty God
to bless me" ("my" lot) and he concluded, "The balance of my
personal estate", etc., showing that he was describing all the
time something he possessed. Though there is some loose language about reforming the will, the court held by construction
that an improved lot otherwise undevised passed under the will.
This seems so clearly sound that one is surprised to find a dis" 2 Ill. L. Bull. 287, 290 (1920).
StWarren (1920), The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919, 33 Harv. L.
Rev. 656 at 560-565. And see 2 Ill. L. Bull. 175 and 293 for proposed
statutory modifications.
8Kurtz v. Hibner was followed in Stevenson v. Stevenson, 285 Ill.
486, 121 N. E. 202 (1918); Bimslager v. Bimslager, 323 Ill. 303, 154 N. E.
135 (1926); and the same rule is followed in California, Lynch's
Estate, 142 Cal. 373, 75 Pac. 1086 (1904); In Iowa, see Fitzpatrick v.
Fitzpatrick, 36 Ia. 674 (1873) (The relief sought here was reformation rather than construction); see contra, Whitehouse v. Whitehouse,
136 Ia. 165, 113 N. W. 759 (1907); Flynn v. Holman, 119 Ia. 731, 94
N. W. 447 (1903), and Wilmes v. Tiernay, 187 Ia. 390, 174 N. W. 271
(1919); Pemberton v. Perrin, 94 Neb. 718, 144 N. W. 164 (1913);
Boeck's Estate, 160 Wis. 577, 152 N. W. 155 (1915). In each of these
cases parol evidence was introduced to correct by construction the
description and "my" or the equivalent was not used. Sherwood v.
Sherwood, 45 Wis. 357, 30 Am. Rep. 757 (1878), may appear to be in
conflict with Boeck's Estate, but it probably went on a question of
pleading, a reformation of the will being sought and refused. See
36 Ann. Cas. 68; 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 942; 5 Wigmore on Evidence (2d
ed., 1923), Sec. 2477; Chafee (1922), The Progress of the Law, 19191922.
117 U. S. 210 (1886). The case is generally followed. See Rook
v. Wilson, 142 Ind. 24, 41 N. E. 311 (1895).
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In Armstrong v. Armstrong4 ' testatrix devised "all my
interest in our former home at Revenna (Nebraska) Illinois being
lot 12, block 2, Max Meyer's Add. to Revenna, Mason County,
Illinois". She also devised the rest and residue of "my" property. There is no town, Revenna, in Illinois and testatrix owned
no property in Nebraska. She meant to devise lot 2 in said block
in Havana, Mason Co., Illinois, in Marguerita Meyer's Subdivision, which had been "our former home". To disregard
"Revenna", "Nebraska", and "Max" is clearly proper. So in
Griffith's Will,42 where testator owned a house at "488 Van
Buren Street" and the nurse, on preparing his will, described
the premises as "my 480 acres on Van Buren Street", the house
passed under the will.
vent.

40

II.

IMPLIED PROVISIONS, CRYPTIC EXPlEssIoNs AND
COMPREHENSIVE DESCRIPTIONS

While many irregularities of expression may be classified as
misdescriptions known as falsae demonstrationes, others consist
of eliptical or cryptic terms while still more are comprehensive
or collective in nature, being used in a free sense and lacking in
precision. The inconcinnity or hiatus in expression may not
reach such a degree of insufficiency as to prevent an attempt at
interpretation. Thus, an equivocation arises. On the other
hand, as Professor Wigmore points out, (1) such a degree of
irregularity may exist that no interpretation is possible.
The general problems studied in this paper are to be distinguished from another class of cases. Thus, the identification
of the beneficiary or of the subject matter may not be entirely
discoverable from the will. The beneficiary or property may be
described generally but the precise identification may depend
upon a subsequent act having independent significance, which
"0Perkins v. O'Donald, 77 Fla. 710, 82 So. 401 (1919), where testatrix gave a lot in a certain block, the latter only being properly numbered. But she concluded with the "rest and residue of my estate"
and in a codicil gave "the remaining one-third of all my property."
Thayer, ibid., p. 466, 473, points out the error of the court in holding
that the devise fails. It arose from the blind adoption of Bacon's
"latent ambiguity" and the assumption that defects and errors are not
ambiguities.
41327 Ill. 85, 158 N. E. 356 (1927).
Wis. 601, 163 N. W. 138 (1917).
4165
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act is not performed for the purpose of complementing the will.
43
Such a non-testamentary act has been described elsewhere.
Statutes have been passed in some states which were designed
to afford aid to the court in cases of irregularity of expression
requiring it to declare the applicable rule in cases of mistake.4 4
It is not clear that anything substantial has been added to the
45
common law power of the courts.
If the identity of the beneficiary is represented by a complete blank, there is evidently no beneficiary named by a writing,
and the bequest or devise must therefore fail. 46

It seems like-

wise clear that a blank in the space where the subject matter purports to be described makes the will equally ineffective.4 7 But a
mere blank does not cause a failure where there is a partial identification such as the Christian or the surname and the identity
becomes determinable by evidence dehors the will. 48 A complete
failure to identify the subject matter of the gift is equivalent to
leaving a blank line and testator's consciousness of the omission
or the lack of it makes no difference.4 9
Incompleteness of expression often arises from the inexperience of the draftsman. The interpreter must then look for his
ideas within the fragments which are present (read between the
lines). Such an interpreter does not have the freedom which
See Swetland v.Swetland, 102 N. J. Eq. 294, 140 Atl. 279 (1928);
Evans (1925), Incorporation by Reference, Integration and .Yon-Testamnentary Acts, 25 Col. L. Rev. 879, 898; Scott (1930), Trusts and the

Statute of Wills, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 521, 552.

"See Bordwell (1928), Statute Law of Wills, 14 Ia.L.Rev. 1,174,
VIII A, 436, XVI B (a). Bordwell lists such statutes in California,
Georgia, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and Washington.
"See Re Dominici's Estate, 151 Cal. 181, 90 Pac. 448 (1907);
Dibble v. Currier, 142 Ga. 855, 83 S. E. 949 (1914).
"6E. g., Trustees of Offutt, 45 Ky. 535 (1846); Re Wirsig's Estate,
128 Neb. 297, 258 N. W. 467 (1935).
,"Crooks v. Whitford, 47 Mich. 283, 11 N. W. 159 (1882).
"Goods of Hubbuck (1905), p. 129 (gift to my granddaughter).
(Why is not Hunt v. Hort, 3 Bro. C. C. 311, 29 Eng. Rep. 554 (1791),
similar-Bequest to Lady T?).
'0Karsten v. Karsten, 254 Ill. 480, 98 N. E. 947 (1912) ("my will Is
that my daughter Mary and my son Charles and my daughter Annie
shall be equally divided between them"); Harris v. Pue, 39 Md. 548
(1874) (no subject matter named); Wootton v. Redd, 12 Gratt. 196
(Va. 1855) (description embraced no land); Hawman v. Thomas,
44 Md. 30 (1876) (same); Davis v. Davis, 8 Mo. 56 (1843) ("I will
that John Ellis receive my in the service"); Mohun v. Mohun,
1 Swanst. 201 (Ch., 1818) (No subject matter mentioned); Re Bassett's
Estate, L. R. 14 Eq. 54 (1872) (same).
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may be assumed by an historian who, for example, seeks to build
up a philosophical system from the extant fragments of the writings of a Greek philosopher. The historian relies upon inference, intuition, upon concepts known to be current at the time,
upon interpretations made by contemporaries and followers,
upon tradition, and all other methods by which these fragments,
oft-times meaningless, individually, are reassembled into a system. But a will must be in writing. The inferences, if any,
must come from the text aided in the proper case by extrinsic
proof and mere conjecture is clearly excluded. But inference
which does not involve too wide conjecture is an essential element
of interpretation and if no inference is required, there is small
need for interpretation.5" Thus the court may infer in a proper
of my estate was inadvertently used for
case that "net revenue"
5
"net residue ". "

While the language may be cryptic or hieroglyphic or lacking in fullness of expression, still it may implicitly contain an
expression sufficient to show what the testator meant to say and
in such a case it is submitted that what he meant to say is what
he did say. The court need only be assured with respect to the
question what persons or property or interests or qualities were
intended to be identified. Suppose we apply this principle to
the case where the testator instructed his nephew to draw his
will giving the estate to "your" (the nephew's) "mother". The
nephew made it read, "rest to my mother". On the face of the
will nothing is wrong. But testator did not mean his own
mother; he no longer had one for she was not living when the
will was executed. If the cryptic words "your mother" had
been used, the meaning of "your" would be explainable. But
'"your" means "my" when transferred from speaker to addressee. "Your" used by the testator means "my" when the
words are assigned to the nephew, the draftsman. One is dis0 Hawkins MS, p. 13, found in Thayer's Preliminary Treatise on
Evidence.
"1Kellogg v. Mix, 37 Conn, 243 (1870) [(a) no disposition was otherwise made during wife's lifetime; (b) the revenue was given to her
children after her death; (c) she was to have the free use of her portion of the estate, which could be nothing else than the net revenue.]
See also Zerbe v. Zerbe, 84 Pa. St. 147 (1877) ("I bequeath to my children, naming some of them, but the others, naming them, shall have
nothing of "my estate". "Estate" was inferred as the object of
bequeath). Cleland v. Waters, 16 Ga. 496 (1854) (the word slaves was
made more inclusive than was strictly called for by the grammatical
structure).
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posed to say that it is not proper to strike out "my" and convert
"mother" into "sister" as the court did. 2 Children often
amuse themselves in play upon this species of double entendre of
"your" and "my". "My" and "your" are variables and the
use of "my" creates an ambiguity. It therefore does not appear
to be overriding the statute to allow the proof that "my" equals

"your"

and "your" refers to the nephew. There is authority
for the statement that if the court can tell from his language
what the testator meant to say, it may find that lie has said that
thing.5a

Sometimes the irregularity may be so slight as to involve
little more than a stylistic elipsis.54 But the English courts have
gone much further. Thus, they have supplied "if he should
live so long" to a limitation to the testator's son for ninety-nine
years.5 5 In another case "first" (son) was inferred and so
2

Goods of Wrenn (1908), 2 I. R. 370.
'Chapman v. Brown, 3 Burr, 1626, 1634 (K. B., 1765) ("The court
may imply an intent not particularly specified in the words"); Covenhoven v. Shuler, 2 Paige 122, 130 (N. Y., 1830) ("where the intention
Is Incorrectly expressed the court will effectuate it by supplying the
1

proper words .

.

. the words may be transposed to make a limitation

sensible or to carry into effect the intent of the testator"); Dew v.
Barnes, 54 N. C. 149 (Eq., 1854) ("May supply words where the sense
manifestly requires it"); McKeehan v. Wilson, 53 Pa. St. 74 (1866)
(Where the omission or insertion of words has left unexpressed or
wrongly expressed what from the tenor of the will was the intention
of the testator the court will permit the will to be read as if the words
were inserted or omitted). See also Ferson v. Dodge, 23 Pick. 287
(Mass., 1839). In Knight v. Knight, 12 N. E. (2d) 649 (Ill., 1937),
rehearing denied, 1938), an interesting subversion of this plain meaning rule arose. T gave to his two children, all his real estate, with the
provision that ...

in the event of the death of either of them the real

estate should go to the survivor. It was held on the death of one his
share did not vest in the survivor and evidence would not be admitted
to show that his intent corresponded exactly with his words, in view of
the general principle of interpretation that where property is devised
simplicIter to one person and on his death to another, the death contemplated, is to be regarded as one occurring before testator's own and
a fee vests on death of the testator. Thus, where a plain meaning
attaches to words but a rule of law gives them a different significance,
a new plain meaning arises which cannot be modified by evidence
showing that the unqualified plain meaning was intended. See also
Pickering v. Langdon, 22 Me. 413 (1343); Howland v. Union Seminary,
5 N. Y. 193 (1851). See especially Delmare v. Robello, 1 Yes. Jr. 412
(Ch., 1792), discussed below (note 58).
"Re Bassett's Estate, L. R. 14 Eq. 54 (1872) ("After these legacies are paid I leave the residue to my sister); Reid v. Hancock,
29 Tenn. 368 (1849) ("Property to my wife during her widowhood
until my children come of age, then divide (it) among them).
u Coryton v. Helyar, 2 Cox 340, 30 Eng. Rep. 156 (Ch., 1745). See
comment on this case in Wykham v. Wykham, 18 Yes. 395, 421 (Ch.,
1811) and see Bellaris v. Wirthwaite, 97 Eng. Rep. 1015 (K. B., 1634)
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supplied5 6 from the context. In Abbott v. Middeton the words
"without leaving issue" were inserted. 57 The converse case
appears where by a narrow construction the court refused to
omit a beneficiary whose name was inserted by a palpable mis-

take.5 8
The American courts have occasionally made similar inferences. Thus, where testator said, "I give to my beloved wife
...so long as she remains single', 5 9 the words "net income" were
supplied from the context by inference. In CtelandI v. Waters °
the words "said slaves" were given a more comprehensive meaning than was called for grammatically, the court inferring the
enlarged meaning because of the implications of the whole will
and also because otherwise there would be little sense in the expression. The testator had named various others of his slaves
closing with special mention of William, whose emancipation he
desired because of his faithful service, "with the issue of all
females mentioned in this item of my will". It was held that
from the context the court should find that the females also were
(Devise to daughter D but if D should die "before she is of age to dispose thereof" then over to E. D lived to be married and died leaving
a child. Held, E takes).
"Langston v. Pole, Tamlyn 119 (Rolls Ct., 1829) (T, in a devise,
passed over the first son of A and limited the remainder to trustees
for the second, third, fourth, fifth and all and every other son in tail
successively and then to the first and other daughters and in like manner. The word first was implied from the use of "second" and from
"other". This was affirmed in the House of Lords).
7Abbott v. Middleton, 21 Beav. 143, 52 Eng. Rep. 813 (Rolls Ct.,
1855) (Devise to wife for life and on her death to T's son for life and
on his death to any children he may leave but if he dies before his
mother (supply without leaving issue), then over. See also Spalding
v. Spalding, Cro. Car. 185, 79 Eng. Rep. 762 (K. B., 1631) (similar);
Re Warrington, N. Z. L. R. 124 (1917) (T wrote "but not including all
other real and personal property, "not" was struck out as being Inadvertent); but in Neal v. Hamilton Co., 70 W. Va. 250, 73 S. E. 971
(1912), the court refused to insert "without issue". In McKie v. Collinson, 292 Ill. 458, 127 N. E. 92 (1920), the word "wife" was supplied.
8Mellish v. Mellish, 4 Ves. 47, 31 Eng. Rep. 24 (Ch., 1798) (T gave
to his natural daughter, Ann, child of E, a large legacy with provision
against lapse. He gave the residue to his natural children born of his
housekeeper, M. He then provided that if any of them (referring presumably to the females sharing the residue, the said Ann, Mary,
Fanny, or Charlotte) die before reaching twenty-one or without issue,
their shares should go to the survivors. On the death of one of the
second set of children, held Ann shares in the part so given over. In
Doe v. Allen, 8 T. R. 497, 101 Eng. Rep. 1510 (K. B., 1800) by Kenyon,
however, the court refused to hold that a fee was created, though such
was the intent because technical words of inheritance were not used.
' Kellogg v. Mix, 37 Conn. 243 (1870).
016 Ga. 496 (1854).
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emancipated. He had other slaves not mentioned in this item
and that fact is the principal basis for this insertion. In Tudor
v. Terrell,61 the testator gave his wife "the following slaves,
to-wit" and he named them, giving thirteen names and intending
to name all he owned. But he mentioned Phillis twice and
Philip not at all by name. It was held that Phillip also passes.
The fact that he meant to name all, used thirteen names and two
names were exactly the same save for one letter was held suffi2
cient to pass the entire number of thirteen. Eickhorn v. MoratG
is even more interesting. The testatrix said: "I ... bequeath
my personal and real property which I received from my father
in real estate, to wit ... without security so long as he lives",
etc. The court treated this principally as a problem of admissibility of extrinsic proof as to the identity of "he". But it is
not simply that. There is, in fact, no devisee named except by
inference, which inference arises from the word "he" itself
unexplained in the will. Suppose we substitute for "he" "my
husband", whom the evidence shows was the intended antecedent of the pronoun. It would still be highly questionable
whether a devise to him is implicit in the language which the
testatrix used. The result should probably be sustained. In
another case it was held that "my estate" may be inferred where
the testator had said, "I give and bequeath to my children"
naming them but expressing no object of the verb and concluding
with the declaration that they should take in equal shares. 63
See also Negro Cesar v. Chew,
"32 Ky. (2 Dana) 47 (1834).
7 Gill. & J.127 (Md., 1835) (T had given various slaves to serve for a
named period and then to be free. As to plaintiff, testator gave him
to serve the beneficiary for five years but made no disposal of him
thereafter. Freedom after five years was implied).
2175 Ky. 80, 193 S. W. 1013 (1917), discussed above in another
connection. Cf., Polsey v. Newton, 199 Mass. 450, 85 N. E. 574 (1908),
discussed supra. In Elk Horn Coal Co. v. Jack's Creek Coal Co., 240 Ky.
769, 43 S. W. (2d) 13 (1931), the court supplied the name of a minor
heir omitted by testator, out of the whole cloth. Cf., Chappel v. Avery,
6 Conn. 31 (1825).
61Zerbe v. Zerbe, 84 Pa. St. 147 (1877). Varner's Appeal, 87 Pa. 422
(1878), seems to reach a contrary result. In Geiger v. Brown,
4 M'Cord 418 (S.C., 1828), the court supplied the word "life" after
natural and in Dew v. Barnes, 54 N. C. 149 (Eq., 1854), where T said
should die without lawful heir, the court
if either of my supplied "sons" from the context. In Graham v. Graham, 23 W. Va. 36
(1883), the testator bequeathed his personalty to A and said nothing
about his land. Thereafter in a codicil he declared that by his will he
had already disposed of his real and personal property and that the
manner of disposition was that indicated for his personalty. The
court held that the real property was undisposed of. In Johnson v.

KENTUCKY LAw JOURNAL

These four cases amply show that a necessary inference may
be drawn, even though in form it is an emendation of the will
in the particular case. It also seems that there is little value in
the oft repeated test stated by the Kentucky court that the question is not, "what did the testator intend to say" but "what is
meant by what he said"? One cannot know what is meant by
what he said unless one knows what he intended to say. Hence,
the more appropriate test is, "what did he mean to say and is it
implicit in what he said"?
In an early case, however, Detmare v. Robello,64 the court
refused to infer a gift which seems to be implicit in the language
used. The testator gave his property to the children of his
sisters, Reyne and Estella. He had three sisters, Reyne,
Estella, and Rebecca. The latter two were married and had
children, but Reyne was a nun. Evidence of intent from circumstances and oblique declarations that he meant Rebecca's
children and not Reyne's was refused. The testator named
Reyne but he meant a sister who had children. The only one
(besides Estella) who had children was Rebecca. Thus, the
falsa demonstratio should not prevent the children of Rebecca
5
from taking. In Baum's Estate"
T executed a will on a day
after his child was born but he inadvertently placed a date on it
which preceded the child's birth. A will executed prior to the
birth of a child and not referring to it is revoked as respects the
child in that state. By a narrow construction of the statute it
was held that the Orphan's Court lad no jurisdiction to consider
the issue involved, inasmuch as the statute grants jurisdiction
only when the issue of validity is in question. The court, however, was correct in saying that the validity of a will is determined by its due execution and not by the issue whether it can
operate or not. There appears, however, no reason why the
Orphan's Court could not have found that the date was erroneous
and not an intended part of the will.
Johnson, 128 Ind. 93, 27 N. E. 340 (1890), T said "but if they die with
any children" then over, the court substituted "without" for "with".
In Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. Atty. Gen., 235 Mass. 228,
126 N. E. 521 (1920) (Legacy to found a school of naval architecture
and marine insurance. Held, insurance is to be construed as intended
for engineering).
1 Ves. Jr. 412 (Ch., 1792).
'260 Pa. 33, 103 Atl. 614 (1918).
Cf., Whiteman v. Whitenan,
152 Ind. 263, 53 N. E. 225 (1899), (where such evidence of mistaken
date was admitted).

IRREGULARITIES O'

TESTA IENTARY EXPRESSION

A series of cases raises the question whether certain descriptive terms applied to lands are to be interpreted comprehensively or exclusively. Thus, Lord Eldon held in Doe v. Oxenden"6 that a devise of "my Ashton estate" should be narrowly
iterpreted as a matter of law to include only the lands in Ashton
parish. The testator owned lands in Ashton, Ashton parish, but
he also owned lands in other parishes, all of which he was wont
to call his "Ashton Estate". Some thirty years later, the House
of Lords refused to follow this narrow construction. 7
Another series of decisions involves to some extent a falsa
dernonstratioin that the premises are described in comprehensive
terms, but a limitation is inserted describing them as being in the
possession of some named person which would restrict the devise,
if applied. Thus, in Goodtitle v. Southern68 the testator devised
all his farms in a named county and parish "in the occupation"
of one "Clay". The restriction was rejected because testator
was mistaken in part as to the occupier.
The comprehensive term "My Cropwell farm" should have
"4 Dow 65 (H. L., 1816). See also Doe v. Greening, 3 M. & S. 171
(K. B., 1814) (similar), and Doe v. Lyford, 4 M. & S. 550 (K. B., 1816)
(similar).
"Ricketts v. Turquand, 1 H. L. Cas. 473 (1848).
See Lewis v.
Singleton, 8 Ky. 523 (1 A. K. Marsh. 1819) (Devise to one son, John,
of 1,000 acres, "part of my 2,000 acre tract". He to take 1,000 acres in a
body at either end that may best please him, all the rest of the 2,000
acre tract to three other sons. The tract included 2,666 acres. John
takes 1/ of 2,666 acres).
-I M. & S. 299 (K B., 1813). See Down v. Down, 7 Taunt. 343
(C. P., 1817) (similar); West v. Lawday, 11 H. L. Cas. 375 (1865)
("Now in my own occupation" disregarded); Hardwick v. Hardwick,
L. R. 16 Eq. 168 (1873) (similar); Whitfield v.Langdale, 1 Ch. D. 61
(1875) (Farm called "Hookland" by estimation 80 acres, "more or
less" in the occupation of C. T's farm by that name consisted of 173
acres all in C's possession. Name and possession prevail over quantity. Should not evidence of intent be admitted?) See also Doe v.
Hubbard, 15 Q. B. 227 (1850), where possession prevailed over all other
considerations and resulted in a narrow construction). In re Seal
(1894), 1 Ch. 316 (My residence called S house and premises thereto,
the same as now occupied by me).
Whether the comprehensive description should carry all the premises which might come within it or whether the restriction should cut

down the devise would now seem to depend upon the intent of the

testator as shown in the evidence. The comprehensive term should be
sufficient to embrace the entire gift intended to be made; Wilson v.
Mount, 3 Ves. 191 (1796) (Freehold and copyholds wheresoever "which
I have surrendered to the use of my will" does not include freeholds);
Corballis v. Corballis, 9 Ir. L. T. 309 (1882) (T recited that he was
possessed of certain leaseholds at D and he devised his said D property. This does not include freeholds at D); Miller v. Travers,
8 Bing. 244 (C. P., 1832).
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been interpreted with an extended meaning in Griscom v.
Evans.6 9 There was a devise to Thomas of "my Cropwell farm
where my son Thomas now resides containing 85 acres more or
less". The scrivener, without instructions thereto, added "conveyed to me by the heirs of my deceased wife". That part of the
"Cropwell"
farm coming from the testator's wife's heirs
amounted to 72 62/100 acres. The testator also had 14 73/100
acres acquired from another source which for many years had
been treated as part of this farm and the whole was in the possession of Thomas. The court refused to disregard the addition
made -by the scrivener and held that Thomas took only so much
as came from the wife's heirs. Relying on Bacon, 0 it was said
that where there is a clear enumeration of particulars appearing as qualifications, the general description must yield. This
case illustrates the error often arising from the application of
unyielding, general rules, to particular cases. One observes that
the acreage is given with near exactness, which fact the decision
disregards. The farm is described as being in Thomas' possession and this again was overlooked. The fact that the addition of the source was without instructions should also be
significant.

III. INEXACT AND LOOSE IDENTIPICATIONS
We are required to interpret the terms "money", "personal
property", "real property", "this world's goods", "surplus"
and "business" where the context may obscurely show that the
terms are used in an extended sense. In none of the illustrative
cases does it appear that parol evidence was offered to explain
the use. The term "money" or "monies" has been used to
denote the general personal property of the testator. 71 The
result may not necessarily conflict with Wigram's rule against
violating a primary meaning, because the meaning is gotten from
the context and not from extrinsic proof. 7 2 "Monies" is an
- 40 N. J. L. 402 (1878).
"Max. Reg. XIII.
1Stocks v. Barre, Johnson 54, 70 Eng. Rep. 336 (V. C., 1859)
("Residue of my monies" means residue of the personalty. The plural
points in that direction); re Taylor (1923), 1 Ch. 99 ("Any money
that may be left"). See English cases cited in 44 L. Q. Rev. 280 (1928)
(money includes furniture); 45 L. Q. Rev. 155 (1929) (money includes
personalty but not realty).
"Re Mellor (1929), 1 Ch. 446 (Home made will. T had directed
his debts to be paid and gave "The remainder of my monies" to various
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inexact term and while it has not often included lands or even
personal property generally, it should not be narrowly limited
unless such an intent is clear. To hold that it does not include
notes, bonds, mortgages or other securities, but is limited to gold
and silver coin or other currency must often be overly narrow. 3
"Personal property" has been held to include land. The
testator in such a case means by "personal" something that is
his own. 7 4 "All this world's goods" may also include land.w
persons); Re Estate of Miller, 48 Cal. 165 (1874) ("I give ... all my
estate real or personal or mixed of which I die seized as follows".
Then he continued, "My mother is to receive the balance of my
money". No other express disposition was made of the realty. Emphasis Is placed upon intent to leave nothing to pass as intestate property); Widener v. Beggs, 118 Pa. 374, 12 Atl. 311 (1888) ("The balance
of my estate to be divided . . . then moneys to be invested", etc.

"Monies" includes land. Presumption against intestacy); Jacob's
Estate, 140 Pa. 268, 21 Atl. 318 (1891) ("Residue of my money to" a
hospital. T, at the time, owned personalty only which was more than
sufficient to pay the legacies. At death she had largely invested in
realty and there was no sufficient personalty to pay the legacies. Held,
she did not intend her heir to take anything. Emphasis on presumption against intestacy. No cases cited); Ostrom v. Datz, 274 Pa. 375,
118 Atl. 313 (1922) (similar); Talbot v. Anderson, 292 Pa. 454,
141 Atl. 256 (1928) ("any money left after everything is paid from my
estate I give to A"). Contra: Swert v. Burnett, 136 N. Y. 204,
32 N. E. 628 (1892) (dissent). See Wigram's Propositions I and III.
For emphasis on 'home-made' will, see also Strickland v. Delta Inv.
Co., 163 Miss. 772, 137 So. 734 (1931). Cf., re Wells' Will, 221 N. Y. S.
714 (Surr., 1927).
'Mann v. Mann, 1 Johns. Ch. 231 (N. Y., 1814).
14Re Wass, 95 L. T. 758 (1906) ("All my personal estate . . . of
which I am possessed ... whether in possession, reversion, remainder,
or expectancy"); re Olsen's Estate, 50 P. (2d) 70 (Cal. App., 1935)
("All my personal property", "personal" means what is one's "own"
and Includes realty); Cf., note, 34 Mich. L. Rev. 901 (1934); West v.
West, 213 N. Y. S. 380 (App. D., 1926) ("Personal property of which
I die seized ... I authorize her to sell ... and to give title to same).
See approval of holding in 74 Pa. L. Rev. 854 (1926), disapproval in
12 Va. L. Rev. 59S (1926). See also re Kavanaugh's Will, 232 N. Y. S.
308 (Surr., 1930) ("Personal property includes realty. Emphasis
upon drafting by a layman, absence of residuary clause and presumption against intestacy"); McCabe v. Carey, 135 Va. 428, 116 S. E. 485
(1923) ("Money" includes land. Emphasizes layman's drafting and
presumption against intestacy).
For English cases see 46 L. Q. Rev. 8 (1930); 46 Jurid. Rev. 295
(1934). Contra: Spurrier v. Hobbs, 68 W. Va. 929, 70 S. E. 760 (1911)
("All my estate personal or mixed of which I die seized" does not
Include land, though the intent in the will itself seems clear). See
also White v. McCracken, 87 Mo. App. 262 (1900); McCullough v. Lauman, 38 Wash. 227, 80 Pac. 441 (1905).
:Torrey v. Torrey, 70 N. J. L. 672, 59 Atl. 450 (1904) ("All this
world's goods of which I may be possessed at the time of my death");
Anderson v. Gibson, 116 Okla. 684, 157 N. E. 377 (1927) ("All my
worldly goods" to H. Emphasis upon composition by a layman). The
contrary view in Bradford v. Bradford, 6 Whart. 236 (Pa., 1840)
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The Supreme Court of the United States placed a narrow construction upon the word "surplus" in Allen v. Allen7 0 in order
to favor the heir. "Surplus" is almost a precise equivalent of
"residue", which term would clearly include both realty and
personalty unless restricted.
Is it possible to devise or bequeath "leaseholds"
as
"realty"? In Anglo-American law a leasehold for years is
Ilersonal property, though it constitutes an interest in land. In
in early case, Rose v. Bartlett,77 it was held that if A has both
lands in fee and lands for years, a general devise of his lands
does not pass the leaseholds, but if the testator owns leaseholds
only, they will pass under such a devise. In Burger v. Hill,78
however, where the testator gave all his personalty to A and his
realty to B, a different result was reached. The draftsman had
asked the testator concerning his realty and was told he owned a
store. His interest, however, was a leasehold and he had no
other realty. It was held that the leasehold went neither to A
nor to B, not to A because testator had intended it to go to B and
not to B because it was not realty. Under the appropriate precedents, B should have it.
Where a collective term is used and the word "other" is
employed to expand its application, it is commonly said that
"other" can be applied only to an item of the same general
character-eisdem genetis. This rule, though now largely
abandoned, is itself a loose generalization admitting of varying
degrees of similarity and should be applied according to the evidences of the intent. Thus, in one case the testator gave all his
stocks, bonds, notes and "other securities" found in his strong
box at a named bank to his grandson, A. Along with such bonds,
("Worldly goods of all sorts and kinds" is contrary to parallel PennsYlvania decisions). And see Thompson v. Betts, 74 Conn. 576, 51 Atl.
564 (1902), where T gave the residue of his personal property, saying
nothing about his realty but in a codicil he indicated that he had used
personal to include all his property.
6 18 How. 385 (U. S., 1855) (prior part of will had referred to
both, classes of property and the "surplus" was then disposed of). For
case where "capital" includes land-heritage, see 45 Jurid. Rev. 183
(1933). In re McCarthy's Estate, 15 P. (2d) 223 (Cal. App., 1932)
("business" was held to include certain realty).
-Cr., Car. 292 (K. B., 1631). See also accord, Day v. Trig, 1 P. Williams 286, 24 Eng. Rep. 391 (Ch., 1715); Doe v. Cranstoun, 7 M. & W. 1,
151 Eng. Rep. 654 (Exch., 1841). Cf., Hall v. Fisher, 1 Coll. 47 (V. C.,
1844); Re Holt (1921), 2 Ch. 17.
781 Bradf. 360 (N. Y. Surr., 1850) ; affd. 10 How. Pr. 264.
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stocks and notes, valued at $15,000, there were three life insurance policies, each for $1,000, two payable to his estate and one
to his widow. Should they pass as "other securities"? The
fact that he gave securities of large value to A and all that he
had in the container save possibly the policies, and the fact that
all these documents have identity of location in common, being
at the same bank and in the same box, and the further fact that
no mention otherwise was made of the policies, would seem to
indicate that "other securities" should be liberally construed 7 9
to include the two insurance policies payable to the estate. After
all, a bond, a note, and an insurance policy is each a promise to
pay and may be regarded freely as eiusdem generis with each
other. An insurance policy contains a promise and is more like
a bond in that respect than is a certificate of stock, save that it
probably is not the subject of commercial exchange to the same
extent. Even a bank-stock certificate, by a narrow construction,
might be construed as not being eiusdern generis with stock certificates of other types of corporations.80
Here also may properly be considered the use of those loose
terms denoting relationships where, for example, one speaks of
his wife's nephews as "my nephews", of "children" when stepchildren or illegitimates are intended, of "children" when grandchildren are meant, "cousins" meaning cousins by marriage, etc.
Thus, a gift of the residue "to my nephews and nieces" may
pass to the nephews and nieces of testator's wife, especially where
the testator has none of his own.8 ' The same principle should
'Ruh v. Ruh, 270 Ky. 792, 803, 110 S. W. (2d) 1097 (1937). The
fact that the testator may have mistakenly thought that one of the
life insurance policies payable to the widow would pass under the
will, makes little difference.
A bequest of all my notes, stocks, bonds and money on hand
does not include livestock, Capehart v. Burrus, 122 N. C. 119, 29 S. E. 97
(1898). See 12 A. L. R. 1179, 54 A. L. R. 97, 4 B. R. C. 14. In Slingsby
v. Grainger, 7 H. L. Cas. 273 (1859), held that "The whole of my fortune now standing in the funds" does not include bank stock nor
current funds nor money.
"' Sherratt v. Mountford, L. R. 8 Ch. 928 (Ch., 1873). In Grant v.
Grant, L. R. 5 C. P. 727 (Exch., 1870) T had a nephew of his own as
well but meant his wife's nephew. Evidence allowed to show his
intent. Root's Estate, 187 Pa. 118, 40 Atl. 818 (1898) (contra). In
Drake v. Drake, 25 Beav. 642 (Rolls Ct., 1858), affirmed, 8 H1. L. Cas.
172, T described his sister as his wife's sister; Blower's Trusts, L. R.
6 Ch. 351 (1871) (T made provision for his "grand nephew". Then he
gave the residue to his "nephews and nieces". The confusion of terms
"grand nephew" and "nephew" wduld make it possible to assign the
residue to "grand nephews and grand nieces" as well as to "nephews

K. L. J.-3
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apply in the case where the testator refers to a step-child by the
term "child" 82 or where an illegitimate is referred to by the
relationship "child" appropriately applied only to one who is
legitimate.8 3 Thus, in Wickersham v. Wickershams4 the testator
had several legitimate children and one illegitimate child. The
latter child had grown up in the testator's family with the others
and was regarded and acknowledged by the testator as his child
without discrimination as the offered evidence showed. The testator divided his property among his "children" and the illegitimate child claimed an equal share. The Kentucky Court of
Appeals relied upon its oft repeated declaration as a principle
of interpretation that it must consider not what testator meant
to say bitt what he meant by what he said. The court, therefore,
held that evidence could not be admitted to show that the illegitimate child was intended to share because the court can't be concerned with what he meant to say.8 5 This proposition that the
court cannot be concerned with what testator meant to say seems
first to have been asserted in substantially the same form by
Lord Wensleydale in Doe v. Givillim;s 6 was repeated Lord Denand nieces". He had six of the latter and fourteen of the former.
Since no further light is thrown upon his intention in the will, it
seems safer to construe "nephews and nieces" in the residuary clause
as not including "grand nephews and nieces".
The problem is different In Willard v. Darrah, 168 Mo. 660,
68 S. W. 1023 (1902), where T had two grandsons, John and William,
and two grand nephews, John and William, (and a nephew, John).
His gift to his well beloved "nephews", John and William, was construed as a gift to his grandsons. T used the term "nephews" inadvertently rather than in a loose and sense here). See 5 Wigmore,
Evidence, Sees. 2463, 2467.
'1Fouke v. Kemp, 5 H. & J. 135 (Md., 1820) is contra. Children
includes adopted children; Beck v. Dickinson, 99 Ind. App. 463,
192 N. E. 899 (1934); note, 10 Ind. L. Jour. 533 (1935). Cf., Hamlyn
v. Hamlyn, 7 N. E. (2d) 644, 646 (Ind. App., 1937).
$1Goods of Ashton (1892), P. D. 83 (T referred to "my nephew".
He had a legitimate and an illegitimate nephew and the latter was
intended. He also referred to an illegitimate grand nephew as "my
nephew".
(For cousin used in secondary sense, see Re Taylor,
34 Ch. D. 255 (1886). Of., Shore v. Wilson, 9 Cl. & Fin. 355 (H. L.,
1852), where it was held that the words "Godly persons of Christ's
holy gospel" found in a deed were explainable by extrinsic evidence).
8-174 Ky. 604, 192 S. W. 688 (1917). CI., among many other cases
re Scott's Estate, 313 Pa. 155, 169 A. 73 (1933).
15Note, 30 Mich. L. Rev. 48 (1932), on Kauffer's Will, 203 Wis. 299,
234 N. W. 504 (1931), and note, 8 B. R. C. 295; 27 Harv. L. Rev. 691
(1914); see also Sullivan v. Parker, 113 N. C. 301, 18 S. E. 347 (1893);
Elliott v. Elliott, 117 Ind. 380, 20 N. E. 264 (1889); re Jackson (1933),
1 Ch. 2347, and note, 49 Law Q. Rev. 314 (1933). See Speeches of
Brougham, Vol. 2, 319, 452 (1838), remarking upon the technicalities
of testamentary construction where we affect most to follow the intent.
5 B. & Ad. 122, 129 (K. B., 1833).
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man; 87 adopted by Wigram;8 and from him probably it was
borrowed by American courts and applied. The answer to the
use of such a formula or solving phrase is well given by Vaughan
Hawkins.8 9 He points out that the function of interpretation
properly used is (a) to discover what the writer meant and (b)
to determine the meaning of his words. There is therefore no
appropriate contrast "between what he meant to say" and "the
meaning of his words", because otherwise interpretation is cut
down to a mere dictionary determination of the meaning of words.
Interpretation can arise only where the words fail to express the
meaning clearly. 91 A perfect expression is not essential.
Language is full of ellipses and ambiguities which are clarified in
many ways. The requirement by statute of a writing is addressed to the writer, not to the interpreter, and it permits the
latter to interpret that command in an equitable and liberal
spirit, making allowances for the manifold imperfections of
language. 92

IV. GIFTS

TO AN ENUMERATED GROUP, THE NUMBER
ERRONEOUSLY STATED

93

In re Sharp the testator gave the residue to five named
persons and to the six children of 0. 0 had had six children but
at the time of the death of the testator there was only one.
Shall the residue be divided into eleven parts or into six parts?
The dominant intent was to benefit whatever children of 0
existed at the time of testator's death and so it was held that the
division should be into six parts. Otherwise also there would
be an intestacy as to five parts.
Four situations may exist: (a) The residue or an aggregate sum may be given and the beneficiaries may be fewer than
8'Rickman v. Carstairs, 5 B. & Ad. 651, 663 (K. B., 1833).
"A Treatise on Extrinsic Evidence in Aid of the Interpretation
of Wills (2d Am. Ed. by O'Hara, 1872), Sec. 9.
SSee Thayer, "A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law" (1898), Appendix C "On the Principles of Legal Interpretation" (1860), by Vaughan Hawkins.
"Hawkins, supra, n. 85 at 582-584.
"1See Hawkins' discussion, ibid., p. 585, of three causes for the
failure of language to express the Intent adequately.
"Hawkins, ibid., p. 598, "Interpretation is a species of equity
which interposes to prevent the mischief which would accrue from a
severe and rigorous application of the rule of law requiring the meaning of the writer to be completely expressed".
- (1908) 2 Ch. 190.
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the number mentioned in the will. There is no violation of the
Wills Act here, inasmuch as the court finds by construction that
-the entire sum was given to the smaller number. 94 (b) The
residue or an aggregate sum is given and the number of the
claiming beneficiaries exceeds that named in the will. The statement of the number conflicts with the dominant intent to benefit
all those answering the description of children and is disregarded.9 5 No considerable violence is done to the Wills
Statute, however, because no more is given than tbe testator
intended to give. (c) A separate legacy is given to each of a
group and the number in the class is smaller than the number
expressed in the will.96 These excess legacies fail. (d) A
"Berkeley v. Palling, 1 Russ. 496 (Ch., 1826), 38 Eng. Rep. 191
(Divide the residue into 8 parts and dispose as follows: Among the
children of R. B.:-2 shares to each of 2 daughters and 1 share to each
of 3 sons. Held, divide into 7 parts, each daughter taking 2 and each
son taking 1); In re Sharp (1908), 2 Ch. 190; Kalbfleisch v. Kalbfleisch, 67 N. Y. 354 (1876) (Aggregate sum to my other 8 children.
There were only 6 others and the word "eight" was disregarded). See
also Regnier v. Regnier, 122 Kan. 59, 251 Pac. 392 (1926).
Stebbing v. Walkey, 2 Bro. C. C. 86, 29 Eng. Rep. 48 (Ch., 1786)
(Residue of annuities to the two daughters of T. S. He had three.
All share); Lee v. Pain, 4 Hare 201, 249 (V. C., 1845), 67 Eng. Rep. 619,
642 (Residue to the three sisters of A. A has four sisters and all
share); Matthews v. Foulshaw, 12 W. R. 1141, 11 L. T. 82 (Ch., 1864)
(Aggregate sum to nine grandchildren, the three children of A; the
three children of B; the two children of C; and one of D. A had four
children, two by a former and two by his present wife. All share);
Re Stephenson (1897), 1 Ch. 75 (Residue to "my first cousins, the children of my father's brother, of the name of Cartridge". The father had
two brothers of that name, both of whom left children. The court
struck out "children of my father's brother" and treated the gift as
made to "my first cousins named Cartridge"). This case is questioned
in In re Stephenson (1897), 1 Ch. 75, as also the rule. The testator
gave the residue to the children of the deceased son (named Bamber)
of testator's aunt. She had had three sons by her husband Bamber,
all of whom were dead, leaving issue. It was held that the gift failed
for uncertainty.
The problem is essentially the same where the erroneous enumeration applies to property rather than to beneficiaries. In Moore v.
Moore (1920), 1 I. R. 232, the executor was directed to sell T's seven
houses at a certain location. He had eight houses there and the direction must fail for uncertainty unless all eight are included. The dominant intent affected all the property there. Cf., Berger v. Clavel,
42 D. L. R. 771 (Can. Sup. Ct., 1917). In re Vismar's Estate, 191
N. Y. S. 752 (Surr., 1921), T gave to each of her five sisters, share and
share alike, one-fourth of all the residue. Held, each takes one-fifth.
Of., Naylor v. Brown, 66 N. Y. S. 729, 32 Misc. 298 (1900); Sleech v.
Thorington, 2 Ves. Sr. 560 (Rolls Ct., 1754) (Gift of an aggregate sum
to be divided between the two servants living with T at her death.
There were three and all share).
"This is the usual case of lapse. In Selsey v. Lake, 1 Beav. 146,
48 Eng. Rep. 895 (Rolls Ct., 1839), T gave a rent charge to be paid to
the five daughters of A for life, to be divided equally between them.
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separate legacy is given to each of the class and the number in
the class is greater than the number named in the will.9 7 Do all
the legacies fail or are all the numbers of the class provided for?
It is readily seen that as respects the Wills Act only the
fourth situation causes difficulty. The problem here is one not
only of discovering whom the testator intended should participate, but also how large a total of benefits lie meant to give.
Thus, where the testator expressly bequeaths to each of three
persons who have a common characteristic five hundred pounds,
a total of £1500, if nine persons having that common characteristic are substituted for the three, a total of £4500 is required
to provide for all. If it were a matter of nine persons instead
of three sharing in the residue or aggregate sum the result of
providing for each might be justified by applying the test of the
dominant intent of the testator. But in the case of separate
legacies, to give £3000 more than the will provides for seems to
go beyond any known standard of interpretation. There is no
gift of £4500 implicit in the gift of £1500.28 The alternative, that the whole provision fails, seems harsh to the English
courts. It is not always necessary, however, to choose between
failure of the gift for uncertainty on the one hand and the transfer of more than is called for in the will on the other where some
reason appears, from extrinsic proof, for selecting the number
so limited, out of a larger number. In such case the stated
number prevails. Thus, where a legacy is given to each of the
two children of A and A has three children, proof of the fact
A had five sons and one daughter. Held, the latter takes the entire
rent charge.
" Tomkins v. Tomkins, cited in 2 Ves. Sr. 564, 28 Eng. Rep. 360
(Ch., 1745) (£50 to each of the three children of A. A had four and
each takes); Scott v. Fenoulhett, 1 Cox 79, 29 Eng. Rep. 1071 (1784)
(£500 to each of the two daughters of C if either or both of them
should survive D. C had three and each takes); Harrison v. Harrison,
1 Russ. & M. 71, 39 Eng. Rep. 28 (Ch., 1829) (Bequest of £50 each to
the two sons and the daughter of T. There were one son and four
daughters. Each takes); Morrison v. Martin, 3 Hare 507 (V. C., 1846);
67 Eng. Rep. 1012 (Five take instead of two); Yeats v. Yeats, 16 Beav.
170 (Rolls Ct., 1852), 51 Eng. Rep. 742 (Nine take instead of seven);
Garvey v. Hibbert, 19 Ves. 125 (Ch., 1812) (£600 to each of the three
children of A. There are four and each takes £600); Lane v. Green,
4 De. G. & Sm. 239, 64 Eng. Rep. 814 (Ch., 1851) (£100 to each of the
four sons of A. H. A. H. had three sons and one daughter. Each gets
£100); Spencer v. Ward, L. R. 9 Eq. 507 (1870) (Legacy of £250 to
each of the two children of S. There are three children and each

takes £250).

"Daniell v. Daniell, 3 De. G. & Sm. 337, 51 Eng. Rep. 742 (V. C.,
1849).
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that two of them lived near the testator and the third did not,
affords a basis for carrying out A's intention.99
It thus appears that a proper construction applied to these
cases generally will accomplish testator's intention. Specifically
the rule is that where provision such as the gift of the residue
or of an aggregate sum is made for a group having a common
characteristic (e. g., the children of A) but the testator also
declares erroneously the number in the group, which is either
larger or smaller than the number named, the numerical restriction will be disregarded.10 0 It is interesting to note that no
American case belonging to the (d) class has been found and one
suspects that here the entire provision would fail for uncertainty.
V.

IRREGULARITIES

RESPECTING ADVANCEMENTS

Not infrequently a testator desiring that his children shall
be made equal in the distribution of his property provides that
the amount advanced to any one of them shall be charged
against his share and shall be brought into hotchpot at final
settlement. He may not at the time know the exact amounts
already advanced to them severally and he may contemplate
future advancements. He may identify the charges as already
having been made in his books.' 0 1 The desired result may, however, be attained without that degree of definiteness, that is, the
books need not be incorporated by reference. Such an advancement may constitute a non-testamentary act which affects the
will. Mvoreover, he may make an erroneous recital in his -will of
the amount so advanced, or he may insert an erroneous entry in
" Wrightson v. Calvert, 1 J. & H. 250, 70 Eng. Rep. 740 (V. C.,
1860); Hampshire v. Pierce, 2 Yes. Sr. 216, 28 Eng. Rep. 140 (Ch., 1750)
(Legacy to the four children of E. E had six, two being by a former
husband, thus a reason for selection is found, but in 1 Jarman 497,
note (p), the evidence is regarded as inadmissible); Newman v. Plercy,
4 Ch. D. 41 (1876) (Legacy to each of the three children of A, widow
of W. A had three children by first marriage and had remarried and
there were six more); In re Mayo (1901), 1 Ch. 404 (Legacies to each
of the three children of C born before her marriage. She had three
whose paternity was acknowledged by T, but she also had another by
another man. Only T's children take); In re Jeffery (1914), 1 Ch. 375
(Legacy to A and his wife B and his daughter. A had five daughters
but T was familiar with Phoebe only and had by prior will provided
for Phoebe. She alone takes).
001n re Mayo (1901), 1 Ch. 404. See 3 Jarman, Wills, 1682-1687;
2 Williams, Executors, pp. 744-746.
101
See Evans (1925), Incorporation by Reference, Integration azd
Non-Testamentary Acts, 25 Col. L. Rev. 879, 892.
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his books.
recital ?

Is the beneficiary bound by such erroneous entry or
In a leading case,' 02 it was declared that there are two

situations: (a) one where the language of the will indicates that
testator means to deduct only the amount advanced and (b)

another where the recital is such that a certain sum must be
accounted for before any further distribution can be made to
the beneficiary. In the latter case there is no ambiguity. Thus,
if the testator erroneously recites that having given certain
lands to A and B, he now gives thke balance to C and D, there is
nothing to be done about it.103
It would seem that recitals of an intention to make all the
children equal would be sufficient to allow extrinsic evidence of
mistake in the entries, inasmuch as an ambiguity exists' 0 4 and
the overpaid child should bring his advancement into hotchpot.
Some courts, however, have refused to give effect to the expression of the intent of creating an equality and have not seen
that equality was inconsistent with an overcharge. 10 5 Even then
11I2 re Kelsey (1905), 2 Ch. 465. See note (1905), 19 Harr. L.
Rev. 68.
l"IDenn v. Cornell, 3 Johns. Cas. 174 (N. Y., 1802) (A and B are
said to be estopped to deny that they had received such a conveyance).
See also Riley v. Casey, 185 Ia. 461, 170 N. W. 742 (1919) (T gave all
of his property to four children, disinheriting two because as he
recited, they had received certain property from their grandmothers,
for which they had, in fact, paid full consideration); Dodson v. Fulk,
147 N. C. 530, 61 S. E. 383 (1908) (She shall be required to account for
$500); Younce v. Flory, 77 Oh. St. 71, 83 N. E. 305 (1907) (To each an
equal share subject to the charges against them in my book); Schell's
Estate, 3 Pa. D. R. 738 (1891) (T directed that certain sums set down
In his account book be deducted from his sons' shares. These were
not, in fact, due from them, but held that T may make an arbitrary
measure of their shares). See re Willis' Estate, 287 N. Y. S. 165
(Surr., 1936), and note (1937), 14 N. Y. L. Q. R. 119. Cf., also Lavinue
v. Lewis, 185 Ark. 159, 46 S. W. (2d) 649 (1932); re Woelk's Estate,
152 Kan. 621, 296 Pac. 359 (1931); Hopper v. Sellers, 91 Kan. 876,
139 Pac. 365 (1914).
" Jackson v. Payne, 59 Ky. (2 Metc.) 567 (1859) (Divide residue
equally. I have made advances to those four, which advances I deem
about equal); Musselman's Estate, 5 Watts 9 (Pa., 1836) (so much as
shall be charged shall be taken as part of the share allotted and each
shall receive as much as shall make him or them equal to that one
of the seven who has received most); Hoak v. Hoak, 5 Watts 80
(Pa., 1836) (each to be charged with what I have given them and with
which I have charged them. The amount given could be shown to be
less than the amount charged, as there was an ambiguity).
McAllister v. Butterfield, 31 Ind. 25 (1869) (named amounts
were directed to be deducted); Barker v. Comins, 110 Mass. 477 (1872)
(this sum, with the advances made to G in his lifetime, will make him
share equally with my other sons); Bresler's Estate, 155 Mich. 567,
119 N. W. 1104 (1909) (But evidence was admitted to show the accuracy of the entries); In re Lear's Estate, 146 Mo. App. 642, 124 S. W.
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there can, of course, be no correction of the error unless the
bringing of advancements into hotchpot was contemplated,
accompanied by a distribution of the residue. 0 6 A sounder
result is reached by holding that the direction to deduct stated
amounts erroneously entered from such child's share on final
distribution is inconsistent with the declaration of an intent to
equalize the shares and that such a direction is equivalent to
"or so much as has been advanced."' 10 7
VI.

IRREGULARITY WITH RESPECT TO THE INSTRUMENT
EXECUTED (MISTAKE IN IDENTITY)

This topic is involved among the irregularities only in that
the testator has inadvertently executed an instrument which he
did not intend to execute, thereby causing himself to fail to
execute the one intended. In such a situation the would-be
testator leaves no will and the executed instrument has no legal
effect. Thus, where husband and wife intend each to sign a
will identical with the will of the other mutatis mutandis but
each actually signs the instrument intended for the other, their
execution is nugatory.' 08 So also where a testator signs both the
original and a copy and one of his witnesses subscribes the original and the other witness subscribes the copy, the two instruments cannot be construed so as to be an integrated whole.' 0 9
But why may not such instruments be integrated? Physically
there exist separate papers. It might be argued that the two
592 (1910) (T said he intended to divide his estate equally and so
had prepared accounts in a described book. Mistaken recital of
advancements held to be conclusive). Cf., Hopper v. Sellers, 91 Kan.
876, 139 Pac. 365 (1914).
'I" In Riley v. Casey, 185 Ia. 461, 170 N. W. 742 (1919) T omitted
two children, mistakenly alleging that they had received compensating
benefits from their grandmother. See Baker v. Comins, 110 Mass. 477
(1872).
1
1I0n re Taylor's Estate, L. R. 22 Ch. Div. 495 (1882) (In the first
codicil T said he had become security for £3,000 and that so much as
had not been repaid should be deducted. In the second codicil T said
he had paid out for his daughter's husband £5,000 and if that sum
had not been repaid it was to be deducted." The two together indicate
a desire to deduct only what had been advanced). See In re Aird's
Estate, 12 Ch. D. 291 (1879), contra.
2OsNelson v. McDonald, 61 Hun. 406, 16 N. Y. S. 273 (Sup. Ct.,
1891). See also Alter's Appeal, 67 Pa. 341 (1871) (same); Goods of
Hunt, L. R. 3 P. & D. 250 (1875) (same--save that the parties are
sisters); In re Estate of Meyer (1908), P. 353 (same). See 3 B. R. C. 341.
1
"In re Baldwin's Will, 146 N. C. 25, 59 S. E. 163 (1907). See also
Goods of Hatton, 6 P. D. 204 (1881) (a will was written in duplicate
and one copy was signed by T and the other by the attesters).
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instruments constitute a literary unity, and that it should not be
necessary to overemphasize the physical separateness and disregard their significant oneness. The Wills Statute, however, is
squarely in the way of such a unification. The converse was
accomplished in Goods of Nosworthy.110 In that case two inconsistent wills were executed, one on one side and the other on the
reverse side of a single page. It was held that this instrument
was severable and the one intended to be executed could be given
effect.
Closely related to such an irregularity of expression is the
case where the general form of expression is the one desired by
the testator, but he does not intend its legal effect. So also he
may sign an instrument, neither intending the words nor their
effect. Thus, a will executed by a testator mistakenly believing
it to be an instrument giving directions for testator's burial,
would undoubtedly be avoided, even if fraud were not present.",
VII.

KNOWLEDGE

OF THE

CONTENTS AND

UNDERSTANDING

OF

THE LEGAL EFFECT AND READING OVER

Though the will must be in writing, it is not required that
testator's thoughts must be stated fully and clearly. There may
be an irregularity of expression to the extent that the exact
legal effect is not intended. The statute seems to require
implicitly that the instrument express the will of the testator
rather than the will of another person and thus a testator is protected in some measure against named but unitended beneficiaries, though his desires respecting intended but unnamed beneficiaries are likely to be thwarted save in those cases where equity
is warranted in creating a constructive trust for them, or where
restitution in some other form may be awarded.
Professor Wigmore points out that all standards of interpretation are provisional only (popular, local, mutual, individual)
and each may in turn be resorted to for help.' 12 He assails
Wigram's proposition 11113 against "disturbing a clear
meaning" because it requires a testator's words to be intrepreted
nQ 4 Sw. & Tr. 44, 164 Eng. Rep. 1431 (Eccl., 1865).
I Hildreth v. Marshall, 51 N. J. Eq. 241, 27 Atl. 465 (1893). See
also Swett v. Boardman, 1 Mass. 258 (1804) (T believed the instrument
was a deed). Cf., 35 Mich. L. Rev. 1049, 1069 (1937).
m"Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed., 1923), Sec. 2460.
"'Wigram, Wills (2d American ed., by O'Hara, 1872), p. 66.
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by the standard not of the one who used them but by the standard of strangers to them but he agrees that we must not go too
far in applying a subjective standard. Thus, in a certain case
testator desired to equalize the provisions for his children and
intended those who had received advancements to be given
smaller portions, and his will was constructed upon that basis.
A direction, however, was inserted by the scrivener which
resulted in an unequal and undesired distribution, because of
his strange misunderstanding of the term "not to cancel" any
of tke accounts. Policy forbids "not to cancel" to be interpreted
as meaning to "cancel". There is the further question whether
the will so interpreted would be in writing.
Closely connected with the problem of standard of interpretation to be followed is the question of testator's knowledge
of the contents and comprehension of what is written therein. 11
One test of knowledge of the contents is assumed to be discovered by a determination of the question whether the will has
been read over by or to the testator. He should measurably
understand the effect which technical testamentary language has,
in order that the document may be said to constitute hjs will.
Questions often arise with respect to inadvertent omissions and
insertions, and careless or ignorant or unusual uses of words and
phrases. Testator's knowledge of the contents is to some extent
controlled by the matter of reading the will over. It may also
n" See Gray, Striking Out of a Will (1913), 26 Harv. L. Rev. 212;
1 Redfield on Wills (4th ed., 1876), 166, ftn. "We doubt if the common
law will allow of a written will being expressed in a language not understood by the testator"; Hastilow v. Stobie, L. R. 1 P. & D. 64 (1865)
(Demurrer to plea that testator did not know and approve the contents of his will, overruled), but see Cunliffe v. Cross, 3 Sw. & Tr. 37,
164 Eng. Rep. 1185 (P. & D., 1863) (such a demurrer sustained); Munnikhuysen v. Magraw, 35 Md. 280 (1872) (Testatrix must know and
understand the actual contents though she may have some erroneous
opinions as to their legal effect). But see Middlehurst v. Johnson,
30 L. J. 74 (P. M. & A., 1860) ("Indeed it is not necessary that testator
be acquainted with the contents. If he had said: "I will execute any
will you draw up and a will had been drawn up and he had executed
it without more, it would have been a good will. See also Parker v.
Felgate, L. R. 8 P. D. 171 (1883) (Will executed according to Instructions is valid, though testatrix merely recollects that she has given
those instructions and believes that the will she is executing is in
accord with them); Clifton v. Murray, 7 Ga. 564 (1849) ("If testator
is blind or illiterate it is not indispensable that his will be read over
to him. The question is not 'did he know it was his will' bnt rather
'is it his will?' ") In Mahoney v. Grainger, 283 Mass. 189, 186 N. E. 86
(1933), the testatrix directed the draftsman to divide her property
among her first cousins equally. He, however, made it provide for her
heirs-at-law equally. Her only heir was an aunt. The will was sustained because testatrix had executed it.
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be affected by the question whether it is written in or read over
in or translated into his native tongue. Even though the testator
may have testamentary capacity, his knowledge even where there
was a reading over "may be affected by his age and strength,
his hearing, his physical condition, and the extent to which he
may be under the influence of liquor or opiates. Even under
normal conditions, the issue whether testator understood or
intended the legal effect of the language used is still often faced
by the court.
The consequences of a misuse of ordinary symbols of speech,
whether chargeable directly to him," 5 or to his draftsman,11 6
often cannot be avoided.1 7 The error of the draftsman as to
the applicable rule of law is charged to the testator.
Just as it is not in all cases absolutely necessary for the
testator to know and approve the contents, so it is not necessary
that he should understand its legal effect. 11s An approximation
is all that can usually be attained. There is a clear distinction
between mistaken omissions on the one hand and inadvertent
insertions on the other, which is somewhat paralleled by mistake
in the inducement to execute a will or to give a legacy, in contrast with a mistaken revocation, the consequence of which is
often avoided under the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. So the subject matter of omissions cannot be inserted but
there are certain situations in which the consequences of an
erroneous insertion have been escaped in case leaving out the
insertion does not increase any other non-residuary disposition.
Whether a will containing an erroneous insertion was read
over to the testator or not has frequently been the test of the
" Elam v. Phariss, 289 Mo. 209, 232 S. W. 693 (1921); Couch v.
Eastham, 27 W. Va. 796 (1886).
"Rhodes v. Rhodes, L. R. 7 App. C. 192 (1S82).
1' Swett v. Boardman, 1 Mass. 258 (1804) (bequest in lieu of dower
omitted because he thought there would be the same result without
it); Brown v. Selwin (Cas. Temp. Talb. 240), 25 Eng. Rep. 756 (Ch.,
1734) (direction by T to forgive the debt of A, A being named executor
draftsman, mistakenly believed the debt was extinguished and omitted
the bequest); Buck v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 267 Mo. 644, 185 S. W.
208 (1916) (T meant to cut off his heir but the language of the will did
not dispose of a contingent remainder); Knutson's Estate, 144 Minn.
111, 174 N. W. 617 (1919) (T thought will would pass realty).
11"Havens v. Mason, 78 Conn. 410, 62 Atl. 615 (1905) (T need not
rationally understand its legal effect); O'Brien v. Spalding, 102 Ga. 490,
31 S. E. 100 (1897) (Need not comprehend the technical terms used);
Conrades v. Heller, 119 Md. 448, 87 Atl. 28 (1918) (same); Beech's
Estate (1923), p. 46 (T cannot say "I approve only if the language has
the effect I desire").
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court's power to omit or disregard it. Thus, where "therein
and" was mistakenly inserted and the words had the effect of
decreasing the provision for the residuary beneficiaries and increasing the value of the principal devises, it was held that the
words could not be stricken because the will had been read over.
But even if they were not read over they should still not be
omitted because an unattested increase would pass to certain
devisees. The court laid down six propositions applicable to the
execution of wills, the fifth being that when a will has been duty
'read over' to a capable testator ...or its contents have been
brought to his notice in any other way, this fact, together with
the execution of it, should be held conclusive evidence that he
approved as well as knew the contents thereof.""' 9 This rule
120
has been followed generally and frequently repeated.
But a distinct disagreement with the universality of it arose
in 1875oin Fulton v. Andrew. 12 1 In this case the will was drafted
by the residuary legatee-a stranger to the testator. There were
a good many suspicious circumstances, such as procuring not the
usual solicitor as draftsman but another one by the beneficiary
the attesters also being strangers. The beneficiaries as witnesses
at the trial testified that the will had been read over to the testator. There being no contrary evidence, it was contended that the
rule of conclusive presumption of knowledge and understanding
should apply. The court, however, for the first time questioned
the fact of reading over as conclusive proof of knowledge of the
contents, and left the issue devisavit vel non to the jury, both as
to the whole will and as to the residuary clause. As a consequence, the residuary clause was refused probate. Fulton v.
Andrew has been followed in several cases.
"Guardhouse

v. Blackburn, L. R. 1 P. & D. 109 (1866).

See also

Stanley v. Stanley, 2 J. & H. 491, 70 Eng.Rep. 1152 (Ch., 1862). ("In
the county of Hants" restrictive of the devise could not be omitted
for the same reason.) See also Rhodes v. Rhodes, L. R. 7 App. C. 192
(1882), Goods of Snowden, 75 L. T. R. (N. S.) 279 (1896) ("not excepting" A, "not" inserted inadvertently); see 26 Harv. L. Rev. 212, 229-236
(1913).
=1Harrison v. Stone, 2 Hagg. Eccl. 537, 162 Eng. Rep. 949 (1829);
Shadbolt v. Waugh, 3 Hagg. 570, 162 Eng. Rep. 1267 (Eccl., 1831);
Munnikuysen v. Magraw, 35 Md. 280 (1872); Wirth v. Wirth, 149 Mich.
687, 113 N. W. 306 (1907); Lutterell v. Olmius, cited in 11 Ves. 638,
32 Eng. Rep. 1236, 14 Ves. 290, 33 Eng. Rep. 532; Meluish v. Milton
(1874), 3 Ch. Div. 27. Cf., Whitlock v. Wardlaw, 7 Rich. L. 453 (S. C.,
1854).
=L.R. 7 H. L. 448 (1875).
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A will, accordingly, may be avoided if the testator is not
conscious of the request made by the draftsman to an attester, to
attest and subscribe the will.' 22 Doubt may be cast upon the
question whether he understood the reading, as in the case where
he was very old and propped up in bed. The proponent must
sustain the burden of convincing the jury that the testator understood its terms.' 23 So, if the will is written in a tongue foreign
to that of the testator the jury may inquire whether the language
was understood by him and may go behind the mere reading
over and execution.' 24 A hasty reading by him just before an
operation, during which he lost consciousness for a time and was
under the influence of opiates, may not be sufficient to acquaint
him with its terms.' 25 A mere cursory reading may not conclusively establish knowledge of the contents.' 26 In Whitlock v.
Wardlaw127 it is said that only if the will is read over understandingly, must knowledge be presumed. Sometimes evidence
is freely admitted to show that though the will was read over
it was not understood.' 28 Though the will may have been read
over, evidence may be admitted to show that instructions were
not followed, and thus the issue of the testator's knowledge
29
raised.
It has been said that a gift may be reduced by striking the
unintended excess (assuming no other provision is thereby increased save in the residuary clause),130 but it has also been held
I" Sanders v. Stiles, 2 Redf. 1 (N. Y. Surr., 1869).
' Ex parte McKie, 107 S. C. 57, 91 S. E. 978 (1917).
321 Sansona v. Laraia, 88 Conn. 136, 90 Atl. 28 (1914); Will of
Nadal, 2 Hawaii 400 (1861); Knutson's Estate, 144 Minn. 111, 174 N. W.
617 (1919); Bradford v. Blossom, 207 Mo. 177, 105 S. W. 289 (1907).

"I Lyon v. Townsend, 124 Md. 163, 91 Atl. 704 (1914)
(residuary
clause not intended and so rejected). Cf., Gaither v. Gaither, 20 Ga. 709
(1856) (Presumption from reading over not conclusive); Ruthford v.
Gleaves, 31 Tenn. 198 (1 Swan., 1851) (same).
SKarunaratine v. Ferdinandus (1902), A. C. 405.
'7 Rich. L. 453 (S. C., 1854).
'Cowan v. Shaver, 197 Mo. 203, 95 S. W. 200 (1906). See dissent
in In re Forbes Will, 60 Hun. 171, 14 N. Y. S. 460 (1891), Affd., 128
N. Y. 640.
Atter v. Atkinson, L. R. 1 P. 665 (1869); Fulton v. Andrew,
L. R. 7 H. L. 448 (1875); Goods of Boehm (1891), p. 247; Sheer v.
Sheer, 759 Ill. 591, 43 N. E. 334 (1895); Lyon v. Townsend, 124 Md. 163,
91 Atl. 704 (1914); Bradford v. Blossom, 207 Mo. 177, 105 S. W. 289
(1907); Re Gluckman's Will, 87 N. J. Eq. 638, 101 Atl. 295 (1919);

Chrlstman v. Roesch (1909), 116 N. Y. S. 348; Ex parte McKie, 107
S. C. 57, 91 S. E. 978 (1917).
" Anonymous, Godb. 131, pl. 149 (C. P., 1587).

KENTUCKY LAw JoURNAL

that where a fee was devised, a life estate only being intended,
there is no way to reduce the devise to a life estate. 131 The
reason why the act of reduction must be so mechanical is difficult
to see. 13 2 The statute requires the will to be in writing, but it
does not declare that all that is in writing within the will is part
of it. There is no objection to a refusal of probate of matter
inserted without testator's knowledge, 33 where other principal
34
gifts are not affected.'
In some cases an inadvertent revocatory clause has been
rejected because not read over. 13 5 Unless the doctrine of
dependent relative revocation is applicable, and it probably is
not, this method of restoring a revoked will seems highly objectionable in those states which require a re-execution or a republication to restore a revoked will.136 In Collins v. Elstone,'3 7 an
instrument in substance a codicil, though in form a will, contained such a revocatory clause which had been read over and
the effect of which was held unavoidable. A codicil containing a
revoking clause should not be construed as revoking the will, of
which it forms a part. Such a result is analytically unsound
38
and it does not conform to testator's intent.
Again where testator referred to his last will of a given date
but gave the wrong date, it is possible to reach the desired result
on the principle of falsa demonstratio,a conflict between the date
named and the words "last will", 39 rather than by striking
Downhall v. Catesby, Moore 356, 72 Eng. Rep. 626 (K. B., 1594).
f., 23 Ky. L. Jour. 559, 584-586 on the logic of reduction.
Vaughan v. Clerk, 87 L. T. R. 144 (1902). The article by Roland
Gray, Striking Words Out of a Will (1913), 26 Harv. L. Rev. 212, is
pertinent to this entire discussion.
II' Goods of Wray, Ir. R. 10 Eq. 266 (1876). See also Siler v. Jones,
33 K. L. R. 317, 110 S. W. 255 (1908), where an unintended recital of
consideration could be overlooked with respect to its bearing upon
whether or not the instrument was intended to be a will.
3-5 Goods of Oswald, L. R. 3 P. & D. 162 (1874); Goods of Wray,
Ir. Rep. 10 Eq. 266 (1876); Goods of Moore (1892), p. 228.
"I See Garnett-Botfield v. Garnett-Botfield
(1901), p. 335 (court
refused to set the revocation aside because it had been read over).
(1893), P. 1.
' 'Gelbke v. Gelbke, 88 Ala. 427, 6 So. 834 (1889). See 22 Ky. L.
Jour. 103, 105 (1934); Owens v. Fahnestock, 110 S. C. 130, 96 S. E. 369
(1922) (Will in 9 items, codicil revoked all former wills and began
with item numbered 10). Cf., Denny v. Barton, 2 Phill. 575, 161 Eng.
Rep. 1236 (Eccl., 1818). In re Dunlap (1929), 1 D. L. R. 542 (Ontario)
(A paper marked "instructions" was regarded as a codicil).
"*Goods of Ince, 2 P. D. 111 (1877); Goods of Gorddn (1892),
p. 228; Jane v. Jane, 33 T. L. R. 389 (1917).
Cf., Hale v. Tokelove,
"I

l'

IRREGULARITIES OF TESTAMENTARY EXPRESSION

out. A square conflict between hand-written and printed terms
of a will, a so-called patent ambiguity, may be resolved by the
fact that the testator intends what he writes with his own hand
and is likely to overlook the contents of a printed form. This
should be true whether the will was read over or not. This is a
better procedure than that of striking out. 140
In still other situations the English courts reach a result by
striking out certain words (where the will was not read over)
which could have been reached properly by construction, even
if the will had been read over. Thus, in Morrell v. Morrell,141
the testator bequeathed "all my forty shares" of stock. The
word "forty" had been erroneously inserted, he having four
hundred shares and intending that all should pass. The striking
out was expressly based upon the fact that forty was unintended
and the will had not been read over. Nothing, however, can be
attained by striking out in such cases. All that can legitimately
be done is to construe the language. Here the word "my" shares
implies "all my shares". An uncertainty thus arises which may
be resolved by other evidence. In Brisco v. Hamilton142 the
draftsman mistook the interest of the testatrix in certain land.
She had once been a joint tenant of the land devised, but the
other joint tenant had died and she now owned the entire property. The draft will devised "all that my undivided moiety"
of the premises and it was executed. The court struck out the
words "undivided moiety" because they were found not to have
been read over by the testatrix at the time of execution, or if
read by her, they had never come into her consciousness. Here
again the same result could be reached by construction. Her
words express an intent to devise her entire interest and the words
"undivided moiety" are at war with that expression of intent.
If the omitted words must be stricken, then testatrix has not
expressed her intent in written words.
Perhaps the only cases where striking out for failure to read
over reaches a legitimate result arises where insertions are inadvertently made which, when omitted, do not change the effect
2 Rob. 318, 103 Eng. Rep. 1331 (Eccl., 1852); Goods of Stedham,
6 P. D. 205 (1881), and Whiteman v. Whiteman, 152 Ind. 263, 53 N. E.
225 (1899).
10 Of., Goods of Duane, 2 S. W. & Tr. 590, 164 Eng. Rep. 1127 (Eccl.,
1S62).
1- 7 P. D. 68 (1882).
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of that which remains. 143 It has been held that in such a case
a specific gift to A, mistakenly inserted and not read over, which
squarely conflicts with another provision in that this specific gift
144
has already been made to B, may be omitted from probate.
An equivocation would have arisen if the gift to A and to B had
each been either a part of the printed form or in the testator's
145
handwriting.
The solution of the problems arising from irregularities of
testamentary expression has been complicated by Bacon's declaration that patent ambiguities cannot be resolved by external evidence. Wigram's plain meaning rule involves a constant war
between the requirements of the Wills Statute and the meaning
of the testator. The falsa demonstratio non nocet maxim has
been given a very limited application in some cases and has been
in conflict in some others with the so-called plain meaning rule.
Magic phrases have occasionally been employed by courts reaching back to the formalities of generations ago, such, for example,
as "It is not what the testator meant to say but rather what he
meant by what he said", as if they would constructively aid in
the solution of any problem. In spite of the every-day violation
of Bacon's doctrine respecting patent ambiguities, and the
absurd results reached under Wigram's plain meaning rule, many
courts still refer to them as though they were rules of nature.
If the plain meaning of words causes an absurd result, something
is wrong with the rule, particularly where the language of an
untrained draftsman is to be construed. If "monies" is shown
to have been used by the testator in the sense of worldly "substance" can it be said that the intent is not in writing sufficient
to satisfy the statute? We are entitled to know not merely what
the testator meant by what he said but also what he meant to say
if that is possible
43 See Hippesley v. Homer, T. & R. 48, 37 Eng. Rep. 1014 (Ch.,
1805). But see Vaughan v. Clerk, 87 L. T. R. 144 (1902).
I" Goods of Duane, 2 S. W. & Tr. 590, 164 Eng. Rep. 1127 (Eccl.,
1862).
21 (In two cases there appears a dictum that if a thing is given to
A In a will and later is also given to B, A and B become joint tenants
of It.) See Whitlock v. Wardlaw, 7 Rich. L. 453 (S. C., 1854); Frelinghuysen v. New York Life Ins. Co., 31 R. I. 150, 77 Atl. 98 (1910). A second alternative is to hold that the provision last written revokes the
former one. A third is that both fail for uncertainty, 1 Redfleld on
Wills (4th ed, 1876), p. 443.

IRREGULARITIES OF TESTAmENTARY EXPREssION

There is a conflict whether or not unobserved omissions
should cause a failure of the will. A plain alternative yes or no
should not be the invariable answer. If a child were thus pretermitted when a substantial or equal share was intended for
him, the issue is quite different from that where a small gift intended for one who was not primarily considered by the testator
is omitted. Fulton v. Andrew and numerous American cases
seem to reach a sound conclusion that the fact of reading over is
not necessarily conclusive. If reading over or other method of
calling the testator's attention to his will is sufficient to assure his
knowledge of its contents, it should also warrant that he has
sufficient comprehension of its legal effect. Finally, where a
separate legacy is given to each of a numbered group (children
of A) and the number is larger than that specified, if each of the
actual number is held entitled to a legacy, it must result that a
gift or some gifts are awarded which were not attested and
subscribed.

K. L. J.-4

